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ABSTRACT 
The New York City Fire Department, like the entire fire service, has been proven 
to be a primary stakeholder in Homeland Security.  The mindset of firefighters is 
influenced by traditional and expected roles that are not fully considerate of the 
challenges accompanying the “new enemy” of terrorism. A fundamental deficiency is 
herein identified as the manner in which information is managed. The FDNY must adapt 
so as to recognize information as an entity that must be collected, saved and utilized 
holistically for greater preventative and response capabilities.  It must adopt lessons 
learned by others in the pursuit of better information management. These needs also 
exist, to a great extent, within the national fire service. This thesis will use a detailed 
analysis of existing FDNY information systems, a review of the criticality of information 
to past events, and the perspectives of FDNY firefighters to identify common 
denominators of deficiency.  It will examine the manner in which others have confronted 
the issue of information management with an eye toward extracting salient lessons.  The 
operational and psychological ramifications of poor information management will be 
explored.  Finally, concepts that hold promise for the underpinning of practical solutions 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) is a pivotal agency that commands 
a position at the vanguard of terrorist-related emergency response within the City of New 
York.  The validity of this statement was proven beyond any doubt by the unprecedented 
consequences of the attacks on 9-11-01.  The critical positioning of the FDNY, however, 
has not been the result of conscious choice or the product of a carefully designed process 
of selective reasoning.  Rather, it is largely the result of mere circumstance.  9-11 
witnessed the dramatic collision of two previously uncoupled worlds.  The first of these 
worlds is that of international terrorism, a complex and indistinct state of affairs 
involving highly motivated participants with evil intent who visit death and destruction 
upon innocents for the advancement of their preconceived ideals.  The second world 
involved in this collision is that of emergency response, a simple endeavor of good will, 
residing at the intersection of government and her people, and founded in altruism and 
personal sacrifice.  Prior to 9-11, these two worlds shared little common ground.  
Emergency response by the fire department had been conducted without regard to 
considerations related to terrorist threats.  Firefighters were interested in saving lives that 
were jeopardized by accidental events through response activity that was characterized by 
well-defined limits of size and complexity.  The use of information that supported this 
activity was limited to that contained within long-established doctrine created completely 
independent of terrorist concerns.  And–judging by an historical absence of interaction 
and cooperation with other agencies–the fire department had considered itself distant and 
uncoupled from other stakeholders in the emergency response community.   
The sudden impact between these disparate worlds–terrorism and emergency 
response–has had far-reaching effects.  The most fundamental of these effects is the 
recognition that these worlds are now intimately commingled and shall forever remain 
coupled.  Terrorist attacks will continue to occur, perhaps with greater frequency and 
magnitude, and emergency responders will be required to perform at extreme personal 
risk in previously unimagined roles.  A secondary effect of the collision–related to the 
unanticipated ruthlessness and magnitude of destruction unveiled by the advent of the 
“new terrorism”–is the recognition that the emergency response community was ill-
2 
prepared to prevent the occurrence of, and manage the consequences of, a large scale 
terrorist attack.  On 9-11 the FDNY, a representative of the national fire community and 
the largest fire department in the country, was proven to be an innocent and unprepared 
victim of terrorism.  This thesis is intended to identify problems that exist within the 
department that, to a certain extent, pre-dispose it to disaster.  More critically, it is 
intended to propose reasonable solutions to these problems.  
 
A. THE PROBLEM 
 
It is widely understood that fire has been the traditional enemy of the fire 
department, and that a challenging new enemy has arrived in the form of terrorism.  It is 
also known that the status quo was proven deficient, to some degree, by early experience 
with this new enemy. Why did 343 firefighters die on 9-11?  Was this number excessive 
or reasonable given the actual needs of the immediate response (a largely unknowable 
parameter) balanced against the potential for collapse of the structures that effectively 
consummated the attack (a “knowable unknown”)?  Is the FDNY doing all it can to 
protect its members, and the citizens of New York City, from the consequences of 
terrorism? And can the fire community contribute more effectively to the national effort 
to detect, deter or prevent an attack?  These are broad questions.  However, analysis of 
the manner in which the FDNY has historically responded, how it has bolstered 
capability to respond since 9-11, and the mindset of those with their “boots on the 
ground” may provide insight into deficiencies in preparedness.  Common denominators 
of inadequacy may thus be identified.  The exploitation of these common denominators 
will allow for the creation of systems that improve the effectiveness and participation of 
the FDNY in the homeland security mission. 
It is posited at this time that the deficiency of greatest significance within the 
FDNY is an inability on the part of that agency to successfully conduct systemic 
information management and control.  It is further postulated that this condition of 
deficiency partially undermines the homeland security mission of the FDNY and, quite 
possibly, represents a dysfunction that is prevalent throughout much of the national fire 
service.  This thesis intends to investigate the validity of this conjecture through an 
3 
analysis of past experience, interviews, surveys, comparative analysis, and analytical and 
deductive reasoning.  The criticality and implications of addressing this problem will also 
be discussed, as well as the underlying reasons for its existence.  Finally, concepts 
designed to support solutions shall be proposed.  It is noted that the great variety of 
informational needs require the reader to maintain a focus on information as a broad but 
consistent core issue.  Much can be learned by simply journeying through the experiences 
of information management in the FDNY.  Ultimately, the result of the analysis is the 
proposal of relatively simple concepts that support a solution to the varied and diverse 
informational needs within the FDNY and the entire fire service.  The analysis relies 
upon the use of case studies and real life examples.  This thesis recognizes that the factors 
elucidated within the case studies, while dramatically illustrative, are not the result of 
impropriety or negligence but rather a function of a natural and necessary developmental 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Terrorism has never been the pre-eminent concern of the New York City Fire 
Department, nor should it be.  The department–known as the FDNY–conducts 
approximately 980,000 fire apparatus responses per year.  Of these, slightly more than 
5% are the result of actual fires.  Approximately 40% are the result of non-fire 
emergencies.1  By comparison, the percentage of responses that possess terror-related 
characteristics is a minor fraction of one percent.  Despite the low frequency of the 
terrorist event, however, the potential consequences–as dramatically illustrated on 9-11–
indicate the overriding need for constant readiness.  In contrast with the dramatic increase 
in the frequency and ferocity of terrorist attacks worldwide over the past 30 years, the 
FDNY has experienced a sharp decline in the incidence of fires and fire fatalities.  A 
measure of this trend that, to an extent, reduces the criticality of fire as a challenge to 
New York City firefighters is observed in Figure 1.  Similarly, the entire nation has 
experienced a steady decline in the number of fires, fire casualties and economic losses 
from fire over the past two decades.2  As opposed to fire related challenges such 
statistical measures are not necessary to grasp the heightened potentiality for death and 
destruction associated with the “new terrorism.”  The pre-eminence of the terms “Al 
Quaeda,” “9/11,” and “jihad” in the national consciousness stand as stark and constant 
reminders of the threat posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism. 
                                                 
1 Figures are drawn from the FDNY Office of Public Information, FDNY Annual Report Fiscal 2005 
(Brooklyn, N.Y.: 2006), 1. 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency,  A Profile of Fire in the United States, 1992-2001, 13th 
Edition, October 2004, available at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-293-508.pdf, 2, 




Figure 1. Chronology of Fire Deaths, NYC   (From Viewpoint from 9 MetroTech, 
“Record-Breaking Year: Civilian Fire Fatalities Reach Historic Lows in 
2006,” January 2007). 
 
Complementing the impetus for enhanced preparedness for these emergent threats is the 
fact that the bolstering of terrorism prevention and response capabilities will naturally 
improve the day-to-day capabilities of the FDNY for incidents of all types. 
The task of maintaining terrorism awareness and satisfactory operational 
capability in a highly active department of over 11,346 responders in the absence of a 
repetitive or clearly defined threat is formidable.3  Many improvements are possible.  It is 
important to isolate those that solve the most critical needs at a reasonable cost.  Chief 
Pfeifer, the initial FDNY incident commander at the World Trade Center on 9-11, 
                                                 
3 FDNY Office of Public Information, FDNY 2007-2008 Strategic Plan (Brooklyn, N.Y., February 
2007), 4. 
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concludes that “the single most important safety lesson learned by emergency responders 
on 9/11 is simply to share information.”4  Such sharing may be that which is possible 
between disparate agencies as well as that which can occur within the FDNY as a 
singular entity.  A reasonable focus in the pursuit of improvement, therefore, is the 
manner in which information is currently managed and shared by the department.  The 
pursuit of methods to improve information management will require a complete 
understanding of the existing relationship between information and the New York City 
Fire Department from an operational and historical perspective.  Understanding what is 
will help to understand what needs to be changed.   
 
A. TRADITIONAL RESPONSE MODALITY:  HOW DOES THE FIRE 
DEPARTMENT RESPOND AND WHY? 
 
FDNY response protocols have been defined by an extensive and relatively 
consistent amount of fire and life safety related activity over a period of approximately 
150 years.  The behavior of the department and its individual members has been 
conditioned by factors that have developed in response to this activity. Historically the 
department has acted in a manner consistently exhibiting four over-riding characteristics: 
1. Response is reactive in nature. 
2. Response has been directed almost exclusively toward non-terrorist related 
stressors. 
3. The response methodology has been derived solely from the concept of 
consequence management. 
4. The department has functioned in a manner that is largely independent of 
other city, state and federal agencies.   
Each of these characteristics may be closely examined in order to identify 




                                                 
4 Joseph Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World 
Trade Center,” Chapter 15 in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 210. 
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1. Reactive Nature of Response 
Despite established protocols and procedures that pre-determine certain relatively 
simplistic variables (such as the location in a building at which a firefighter operates and 
the tools that he carries), firefighting operations by the FDNY at the scene of an 
emergency are not based upon a significant degree of organizational preparedness and are 
highly reactive in nature.  Many decisions are made in response to objectives and threats 
perceived on-scene, after arrival.  These factors vary widely from incident to incident.  
As pointed out by Gary Klein in Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, 
firefighting possesses ill-defined goals and does not lend itself to analog based decision 
making.5  The largely reactive nature of response is evident in a modality predicated 
upon the sudden receipt of a limited amount of information specific to an emergency 
followed by a rapid response.  “Known” information that is specific to an incident and 
obtainable prior to arrival at the incident scene is automatically provided to the officer 
upon receipt of an alarm in a written form known as a “response ticket.”  This ticket, 
typically smaller than a sheet of memo-pad paper, contains details such as the location of 
the incident and a limited amount of information descriptive of the emergency as reported 
by the “caller” (or, in the event of an automatic alarm, the type of alarm transmitted).  A 
typical response ticket is shown below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Typical Response Ticket, FDNY 
 
As can be seen in the response ticket, the time, location, and the general reason 
for the alarm are presented in a simple and reasonably clear manner.  Engine 288 (a 
                                                 
5 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions  (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1999), 
12, 128. 
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Squad company) is to respond at 8:46 AM to a fire in Manhattan.  The fire is located in 
the “A” apartment on the 21st floor of a multiple dwelling located at 81 Street and Central 
Park West. 
Response tickets are variable.  At times the information contained within the 
ticket is lengthy and complicated due to an abundance of data-based “known” 
information regarding that location.  With an average response time of 4 minutes 31 
seconds from receipt of the alarm to arrival at the scene, the officer in charge of a fire 
company on a typical response has a small window of time in which to review, 
assimilate, and share this information with his crew members.6  At other times the 
information is sparse and potentially incomplete, with important information never 
having been “learned” by the department.  In each instance – an over-abundance or 
dearth of information – the response is often inadequately supported. 
Given the limitations associated with the existing methodology of information 
transfer most decisions concerning the management of an emergency are made on-site, 
dependent upon observable circumstances, under intense time pressure, and absent of a 
significant amount of supportive planning and incident-specific information.  This is not 
to suggest an absence of policy and procedures or systemic support.  Two primary 
mechanisms exist within the organization that serve to assist the on-scene decision 
making process: 
• Volumes of information have been published that are related to the 
management of incidents and the tactics to be employed by individual 
members and companies.  These are embodied within documents known 
as FDNY Firefighting Tactics and Procedures.7  These procedures, 
although widely understood and consistently applied by fire department 
officers and firefighters at emergency scenes, are relatively general in 
nature.  They effectively serve as guidelines for incidents that fall within 
any of several categories, such as fires in tenements, fires in high rise 
buildings, or hazardous material releases.  Specific types of terrorist 
related incidents are not among these categories.  Furthermore the 
information within these procedures, while general in nature and adaptable 
within limits at the firefighting “company” level, is simultaneously 
relatively fixed with little capacity for adaptation at the organizational 
                                                 
6 FDNY, “New York City Fire Department Statistics, 01-01-06 to 12-31-06,” available at 
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/stats/fire_cwsum_cy06.pdf, last accessed on February 4, 2007. 
7 FDNY Publications Office, Firefighting Tactics and Procedures (Brooklyn, N.Y.: variable dates). 
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level.  For example, a company level officer at a fire can change the 
typical assignment of a firefighter and understand the implications of this 
change; however, altering the duties of the entire first alarm assignment 
will introduce unmanageable levels of unpredictability and uncertainty at a 
fire scene.  Another typical example of relative rigidity in protocols is the 
consistent requirement for the establishment of a command post in the 
lobby of a building, whether or not the emergency has terrorist overtones.  
A fixated lobby command post may be suitable for a fire yet catastrophic 
for a terrorist event as evidenced on 9-11. 
• Occupancy-specific information related to a response is sometimes 
available within an information management system known as the 
“Computer Information Dispatch System” (CIDS).8  This system uses the 
response ticket as an “enhanced” information delivery mechanism for 
specific locations.  CIDS systemically delivers some particularly 
important building and occupancy characteristics of a given occupancy.  
This information is automatically triggered at the point of dispatch by the 
actual address of the emergency, and is provided to the responding officer 
by way of inclusion on the printed response ticket that arrives in the 
firehouse prior to response (illustrated in Figure 2 above).  The CIDS 
system and its limitations are more fully explored in a later chapter. 
 
2. Non-terrorist Causation 
Department response is historically derived from the predication that all incidents 
are accidental in nature.  This mindset has, to a large extent, become ingrained within 
FDNY responders and is reinforced by the overwhelming percentage of responses that 
result from accidental causation.  Consequently, a pattern of conditioned behavior has 
developed over time.  The response to the Twin Towers on 9-11 may be seen as an 
extreme, but appropriate, example of the problems associated with this routinized 
mindset.  Despite early recognition of the event as terrorist-derived, incident command 
and control personnel were unable to significantly alter response protocol and proceeded 
largely as if the event were accidental in nature.  Such a methodology ignores the 
fundamental nature of terrorist attacks as being “designed to kill” and, on 9-11, 
underestimated the potential contribution of the physical structures themselves to the 
terrorist intent.  It may be seen that the culture within the FDNY, including expectations, 
training and protocols, have evolved to support and encourage this reactive response 
                                                 
8 CIDS is intended to provide a mechanism whereby company officers who observe items of concern 
in an occupancy, i.e., hazardous materials in a building, or unusual and dangerous construction 
characteristics, can record such information in a manner that allows it to be automatically dispatched to 
future responders when an alarm is transmitted for that particular address. 
11 
methodology regardless of the nature of the emergency incident.  A large number of 
diverse firefighting protocols exist within the Firefighting Procedures.  Their 
characteristics are dependant upon such reasonably predictable variables as the nature of 
construction of a building, its age, the location and extent of fire, and the type of 
occupancy involved.  Within this context no provision exists for differentially addressing 
intentionally derived versus accidental causation.  This “one size fits all” response 
modality was proven inadequate on 9-11. 
 
3. Consequence Management 
Traditionally, the motivation that supports response has been entirely based in 
consequence management as opposed to such concepts as prevention, information and 
intelligence sharing, and collaboration with other concerned parties.  Prior to 9-11, this 
tactical and reactive nature of response methodology had served the department well.  
Fires were extinguished efficiently and lives were routinely saved in a highly professional 
manner by firefighters who were ignorant of parameters outside of normal firefighting 
concerns.  And although the awareness level of individual firefighters regarding terrorism 
has changed in natural and personal response to the horrors of 9-11, it will be seen that 
relatively little has been done to holistically and systemically improve the capability of 
the department to contribute to the prevention of a terrorist attack or to reduce the impact 
of such an attack.  It will also become evident that there is a notable absence of 
recognizable counter-terrorism improvements that involve the “rank and file” of the 
department.  For instance, the results of a survey conducted within the FDNY in late 
2006 indicate that only 15% of respondents reported being aware of an entity within the 
department that is specifically designated to obtain terrorist related information and 




Lastly, and importantly, the FDNY has become conditioned to operate 
autonomously.  The vast majority of fire and emergency incidents to which the 
department responds are handled exclusively by fire department personnel as a result of 
12 
the nature of those incidents.  It is a simple fact that there is no need for a significant level 
of collaboration between the FDNY and other entities at the vast number of routine fires 
and medical emergencies which do not rise to the level of a “unified command.”  
Subsequently, the pre-9/11 world of emergency response existed in an environment 
without true collaboration and cooperation–largely because this was not perceived as a 
fundamental need.  Indeed, controlling doctrine specifically delineated the types of 
incidents for which individual first response agencies were responsible, and efforts were 
made at the mayoral level to address field-level problems that reflected a historic absence 
of cooperation.9  The experience of 9-11 resulted in the recognition of the need for more 
drastic changes.  A recommended “starting point” for improvement, verbalized during   
9-11 related testimony by the (then) Commissioner of the New York City Office of 
Emergency Management, was identified as follows: 
 
Historically, firefighters fought fires, police officers fought crime and 
EMS workers treated the injured.  Now, all emergency service personnel 
must work together to fight terrorism.10 
The publication of the New York Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) 
in May 2005, a unique derivative from, and proxy for, the federally mandated National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), was intended to address these needs by providing 
a framework for unified command and information sharing at emergency incidents in 
New York City.  There are limitations in the efficacy of this protocol, however.  First, it 
is intended solely to facilitate response activity, and contributes little toward 
identification, prevention, mitigation and deterrence of an event through information 
management.  Secondly, successful implementation of CIMS remains questionable.  The 
continued adherence by the fire department to autonomous standard operating 
methodology during non-terrorist responses (the vast majority of response activity) 
fosters independence within each agency.  Furthermore, the absence of recent bona-fide 
                                                 
9 “Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New York,” signed July 2001 by Mayor 
Giuliani, is a mayoral directive that stipulated separate incident command responsibilities for the NYPD 
and the FDNY based upon incident type. 
10 Testimony of the Former Commissioner of the New York City Office of Emergency Management 
Richard J. Sheirer, Opening Remarks Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, May 18, 2004, 10, available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11/sheirer_statement.pdf, last accessed on January 5, 2007. 
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terrorist attacks in New York City results in a largely untested cooperative terrorism 
response mechanism.  Recent examples of autonomy in response to accidental incidents, 
and occasionally conflict at incident scenes, attest to the fact that the level of 
collaboration and cooperation has not significantly improved.  These include land-based 
and water-based emergencies.11  Lastly, inter-agency drills intended to reinforce and 
substantiate a high level of cooperation between response agencies have in reality proven 
that significant problems exist.  For example, a recent emergency response drill was 
characterized by problems with inter-agency coordination.  Simulated chemical release 
“victims” awaiting rescue for over one hour as a result of the inability of different 
agencies to identify and communicate the nature and severity of the hazards.  Agencies 
responded to the drill in a manner that was not consistent with the manner that they 
would normally respond.  Additionally, agencies placed vehicles in a manner that 




This chapter has formed a foundation for deeper analysis by describing the 
manner in which the FDNY has conducted business over the course of its lengthy 
existence. The department remains first and foremost a response agency. It has 
historically responded on its own to incidents that are accidental in nature.  The resultant 
protocols developed by the FDNY are not designed for prevention nor are they 
specifically amenable to terrorist events.  The consequences of 9-11 strongly support this 
contention and have provided motivation to change; however, changes have been 
restricted to response capabilities and remain unproven in effectiveness.  The reasons that 
underlie the inability or unwillingness to change in a more effective manner warrant 
further exploration. 
                                                 
11 Robert McFadden, “Officer Imperiled Rescuer’s Life, Fire Union Says,” New York Times,  July 11, 
2003, B1;  Michael Brick, “Crime Scene or Rescue? Man in Chimney Causes a Clash,” New York Times, 
June 28, 2003, B1;  and Martin Schwartz, “Ending the Battle of the Badges,” New York Times, August 30, 
2003, A15.  
12 Sewell Chan, “Flaws in March Emergency Drill are Disclosed,” New York Times, 26 May 2006, 
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III. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE FDNY 
We have seen how the FDNY has responded in the face of traditional threats.  
How is it supposed to react in light of the terrorist threat that forced its way into the 
national consciousness on 9-11?  The direction of effort on the part of an individual or 
public agency is governed by the expectations that exist regarding their respective roles.  
These expectations often exist at more than one level.  What expectations exist for the 
fire community and the FDNY?  An objective analysis of the current state of readiness of 
the FDNY and, by extension, the entire national fire community requires that the 
expectations that apply to the fire service be fully understood. In this pursuit four 
doctrines warrant evaluation.  The first of these are the collective federal government 
directives and guidelines that are intended to underpin the readiness of the nation.  These 
provide general direction to the entire national counter- terrorism community, including 
the expectations held for the fire service.  The second component worthy of analysis is 
the policy of the governance of New York City that dictates the focus of effort for the 
FDNY, specifically.  Thirdly, it is important to investigate what the national fire 
community expects of itself as indicated by a self-assessment survey.  Lastly, the 
expectations that the FDNY holds for itself are important in understanding the extent of 
change necessary to implement true preparedness. 
 
A. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:  WHAT DOES IT EXPECT FROM 
THE NATION’S FIREFIGHTERS? 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been tasked by the President 
with developing strategies aimed at improving the security of the nation.  How are 
firefighters considered within this context?  A review of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security reveals that the primary strategic objective of homeland security is 
the prevention of terrorist attacks, and the secondary strategic objective is the reduction 
of the nation’s vulnerability.13  Within this same document the nearly 3 million state and 
                                                 
13 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002), vii. 
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local responders of all types are considered to be vital in the response to, and aftermath 
of, a terrorist attack.14  The document indicates that a primary concern regarding these 
assets is their mobilization “without warning,” and that it is important to improve local 
responder tactical counter-terrorism capabilities.15  A divergence exists within the 
document, however.  The law enforcement community, while included within the various 
references to tactical response capabilities, is specifically directed at many locations 
within the document to assign priority to preventing and interdicting terrorist activity.  It 
is also repeatedly tasked with developing information sharing capabilities and is tied to 
the intelligence community in this regard.  No mention is made of comparable roles for 
the fire community.  Rather, outside of directives related to response activity the fire 
service is included within the all-inclusive term “government agencies” regarding 
counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and preparedness generally.  It is clear that the 
fire community is viewed within the National Strategy as almost exclusively a response 
capability, and that expectations regarding such pre-incident concerns as prevention, 
deterrence, and mitigation are the same as those applicable to sanitation, parks 
departments, public works and even private citizens.  For instance, the Strategy identifies 
the need to “integrate information sharing across state and local governments, private 
industry, and citizens.”16  This directive lacks specificity or direct applicability to fire 
departments and is therefore inconsiderate of both the inordinate risk and the unique 
nexus of fire responders to terrorism.  The national strategy is therefore notable for the 
absence of a clear and designated role for the fire community in the preparation for, or 
mitigation of, terrorist attacks, other than activities aimed at consequence management 
including interagency planning and exercises aimed at response and recovery. 
DHS provides further recommendations regarding the integration of various 
resources through its Fusion Center Guidelines.17  These guidelines and the philosophy 
that drives them, developed in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), 
have been broken down into three separate phases–law enforcement, public safety, and 
                                                 
14 OHS, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 41. 
15 Ibid., 43. 
16 Ibid., 57. 
17 U. S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center Guidelines: 
Law Enforcement Intelligence Component (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 25, 2005). 
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the private sector.  To date only the “law enforcement” guidelines have been published; 
presumably the fire community will be incorporated within a similarly derived “public 
safety” document when it becomes available.  The currently published information, 
though law enforcement-centric, encourages an emphasis toward a culture of sharing vis-
à-vis the “fusion center” concept.18  The recommendations contained within are 
conceptual and strategic in nature and serve to reinforce the need for public and private 
entities to share and collaborate.  The document also stipulates nine guidelines that will 
assist the development of a workable fusion center and recommends that currently 
existing criminal intelligence sharing plans be used as a model for fusion.  It therefore 
provides general direction for the law enforcement community to collaborate with others.  
These recommendations are not packaged in a manner that is directly applicable to the 
fire community.  Within limits they may be “borrowed” by the fire service as it 
approaches fusion as a counter-terrorism strategy.  Shortfalls in this adaptation process, 
however, include the fact that the Guidelines are not specific to overcoming a significant 
barrier that is unique to the fire community: that is, a traditional mindset that is oriented 
toward response to the exclusion of other considerations.  The Guidelines are also not 
useful in the implementation of specific efforts to revise policies and procedures that 
have evolved from this traditional mindset. 
Federal recommendations are also provided within the DHS’ Office of Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence.19  
This document, circa June 2003, identifies five functional categories where 
improvements may be made as jurisdictions embark upon the development of prevention-
related plans.  A consistent theme throughout these Guidelines is collaboration between 
virtually everyone involved in domestic preparedness, including the general public.  
Within the categories that are identified may be found several guidelines that are 
inclusive of the fire service.  Again, as observed in the National Strategy, these 
guidelines are well intentioned and useful within limits.  However, they do not form a 
                                                 
18 A fusion center is defined on page 3 within the Guidelines as “an effective and efficient mechanism 
to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the 
ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources.” 
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland 
Security, Prevention and Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 2003).  As of January 2006, ODP is 
known as the Office of Grants and Training (G&T). 
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basis for the realization of the unique systemic potential contribution of the fire service to 
national preparedness.  References to the fire service in the document are non-specific 
and “communal.”  They equate the fire service to entities that, if considered to be 
stakeholders in terrorism, represent distant stakeholders.  For instance, the Guidelines 
refer to firefighters as “non-enforcement government personnel,” “second and third 
responder agencies,” and “others (e.g., fire, EMS, PW, HC, social services, etc…).”20  
Recommendations delivered in such a communal manner are naturally restricted by the 
capabilities of the least motivated, and least influential, communal participant.  The 
Guidelines therefore fall short in the identification of the fire service as an exceptional 
contributor to homeland security.  It does not acknowledge the proximity of firefighting 
to terrorism, a concept that is expanded upon later in this thesis.  It also ignores the 
inordinate interest of individual firefighters in preventative measures, an interest that 
naturally derives from risk.  Included among the recommendations in the Guidelines are 
the following:  the suggestion that first responders be trained to recognize suspicious 
activity and behaviors that might forewarn of a pending terrorism conspiracy or plot, that 
the intelligence cycle be designed to ensure that all appropriate agencies and 
organizations at all tiers receive information on a need-to-know basis, and that training 
for all agencies and the public emphasizes collaboration.21  These guidelines are helpful 
but limited by their lack of specificity.  Their general nature reduces their efficacy. 
Additionally, the recommendations also focus on singular disassociated aspects of 
prevention, and exhibit a reluctance to challenge the barriers inherent in the culture of 
firefighting. 
The National Response Plan is another significant post 9/11 document that 
concerns the activities of the national fire community, among many others.  It is designed 
to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, 
and recovery.22  It is directed toward operational coordination concerning incident 
                                                 
20 DHS, Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security, Prevention and 
Deterrence, 17, 9, 20. 
21 Ibid., 20, 12, 10. 
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
December 2004), 2. 
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management; however, it applies to “an evolving incident or potential incident rather than 
steady-state preparedness or readiness activities.”23  The document is therefore response-
centric.  It is inconsiderate of information management or sharing concerns that exist 
outside of, and in preparation for, a response, particularly those that seek to provide a 
broad-based foundation of improvement in prevention capabilities. 
 
B. NEW YORK CITY:  WHAT DOES IT ASK OF THE FDNY? 
 
The local requirements specific to the FDNY and its role at terrorist incidents are 
encompassed within the CIMS.  This is a response-specific directive that is decidedly 
unconcerned with preparedness as a concept in homeland security.  CIMS provides 
information to assist in the establishment of a command structure and assigns specific 
responsibilities to the various agencies at the scene of an incident, based upon the core 
competencies of each agency.  No specific identifiable mandate or recommendation for 
prevention, preparation, mitigation or information sharing exists within the document.  
Similarly, a very small percentage of training within the department is devoted to such 
topics as the recognition and identification of terrorist indicators and how to behave at a 
potential terrorist incident.24  No training is provided for the systematized reporting of 
such indicators. 
 
C. THE FIRE SERVICE:  WHAT DOES IT ASK OF ITSELF? 
 
The FDNY is in many ways a microcosm of the entire fire community.  It is 
therefore important to understand how this larger community looks at itself.  A recent 
self-assessment survey conducted by the NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 
indicates by its very questions the manner in which the fire service evaluates its own 
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
December 2004), 4. 
24 A singular 8-hour “Weapons of Mass Destruction” class is provided to all FDNY responders, as 
delivered through the International Association of Firefighters Haz-Mat/WMD Training Department. 
20 
operational potential.25  This survey is designed to elicit important information from 
firefighters that supports the future needs of the fire service.  The construct of the survey 
is revealing.  It is specific only to such concerns as training for technical “hands-on” 
rescue and haz-mat response; apparatus shortfalls; physical fitness programs; fire 
prevention and code enforcement; and communications capabilities.  Only one section of 
the report is tangentially related to terrorism awareness, entitled “The Ability to Handle 
Unusually Challenging Incidents.”26  Even within this section of the survey report, 
however, the emphasis of the questions and subsequent results are pointedly tactical and 
responsive in nature, and do not possess a relationship to preparation or prevention. 
 
D. WHAT DOES THE FDNY ASK OF THE FDNY? 
 
The intentions of the FDNY are most fully elaborated upon within the 2007-2008 
FDNY Strategic Plan, the second such document in the history of the department.  Within 
this plan is found further evidence that anticipated needs and future directions are rooted 
firmly in response to the exclusion of comprehensive terrorism preparedness. 27  On the 
surface this may be construed as reasonable.  As stated previously, the overwhelming 
majority of fire department activity is unrelated to terrorism and may therefore be 
improved through extensions of time-proven traditional methodologies.  The document 
describes plans for mechanisms to support response to all emergencies through 
improvements in communications, command capabilities, and training.  It places a heavy 
emphasis on technological solutions to current problems.  It does not, however, address 
terrorism preparedness as a key objective, nor does it identify terrorism as a concern that 
may require special attention prior to response.  Improvements in FDNY capabilities for 
terrorism response will undoubtedly occur if the 5 key objectives enumerated within the 
document are implemented (these are as follows: improved emergency response; 
enhanced health and safety; strengthened management; increased diversity; and improved 
fire prevention).  However, these improvements will be incidental to other objectives and 
                                                 
25 U.S. Fire Administration and the National Fire Protection Association, Four Years Later – A Second 
Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 2006). 
26 U.S. Fire Administration and the National Fire Protection Association, Four Years Later, 99-128. 
27 FDNY, FDNY 2007-2008 Strategic Plan.  
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will be less than what could be realized if terrorism was explicitly targeted as a key 
objective.  The risk faced by firefighters warrants a concerted effort toward the 
prevention of the terrorist act, rather than simply defaulting to response because “that’s 
the way we always did it.”  The document also fails to identify needs that exist at the 
individual firefighter level, such as the ability to better prepare for terrorism through 
increased awareness, improved recognition and identification skills, and methodologies 
to communicate information through the chain of command.  In similar fashion the 
Strategic Plan fails to identify information-based prevention policies that incorporate the 
vast army of firefighters distributed throughout the city.  The proposed organizationally 
derived technological and training based solutions are beneficial, but they fail to leverage 
the collective strength of the army of individuals who comprise the FDNY. 
A promising addition to the Strategic Plan is the initiative that states “operational 
personnel will work with Fire Prevention to incorporate fire prevention databases into a 
risk assessment-based system” that supports response.28  This indicates at least a measure 
of pre-planning, and the incorporation of operational personnel into a systematized 
preparedness effort. 
In tandem with the Strategic Plan, an analysis of FDNY policies and procedures 
provides insight into the manner in which the department intends to function.  Simply 
stated, the various documents that firefighters use to determine their day-to-day activities 




An analysis of expectations regarding the FDNY and the entire fire community 
indicates that a consequence management function will be satisfactory to those within 
that community, and to New York City itself.  The federal government, on the other 
hand, recognizes the utility of the fire service (and virtually everyone else) as a partner in 
general preparedness but fails to fully comprehend the potential contribution that derives 
from the unique motivation and capabilities of firefighters.  Despite the post-9/11 
emphasis on increased readiness and information sharing across all levels of the 
                                                 
28 FDNY, FDNY 2007-2008 Strategic Plan, 12. 
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government (a concept reinforced by DHS publications and the burgeoning fusion center 
concept), no specific and dedicated recommendation exists at the federal level for a 
significant involvement by the fire community in the roles of prevention or deterrence of 
a terrorist event.  Hence there is little formal incentive at the local fire department level to 
manage terror related information or intelligence aimed at anything outside of response.  
Similarly, New York City has not formally isolated a function outside of response for the 
11,163 firefighters that serve its citizens.  The FDNY itself appears to be concerned with 
emergency response, medical response and diversity of the workforce to the exclusion of 
terrorism as a singular need.  Analysis therefore indicates that the Department is only 
partially prepared for terrorist activity based upon conditioned behavior and expectations.  
What types of improvements might optimally enhance preparedness at the individual and 
organizational levels?  According to FDNY needs as expressed by Chief Joseph Pfiefer, a 
new and expanded system of information management is worthy of investigation.  Such a 
system is logically predicated upon a broader system of holistic information management 
in the FDNY. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
It is apparent that the expectations and capabilities of the FDNY remain response-
centric.  This is justifiable for the vast majority of activity that the department engages in.  
It does not, however, excuse the department from having a capability to deal with 
terrorism in ways that optimize effectiveness.  “Business as usual” will not reduce the 
potential for another 9-11.  The need for the fire service as a whole to contribute in a 
more effective manner has not been extensively studied on a local or national scale.  
Considering this backdrop the existence of ways in which the FDNY and the fire 
community can further contribute is incomplete, including mechanisms to better manage 
information.  In the search for optimal effectiveness a multi-tiered and broad-based 
process is in order.  The first tier is fundamental and unprecedented: a survey of FDNY 
responders that is intended to provide insight into the level of information support as 
perceived by those with their “feet on the ground,” and by those who supervise them.  
The rationale for obtaining survey results is an understanding that those who use 
information at the most basic level may be best equipped to identify critical needs.  The 
perceptions gained via this survey will be used to substantiate or amplify related issues 
throughout the thesis.  The second tier will involve the determination of a working 
definition of information and the identification of different types of information as they 
pertain to the fire service.  Once defined, the influence of these concepts on the 
traditional FDNY response modality will be explored.  In this manner shortfalls and gaps 
in the traditional utilization of information may be identified.  Tier 3 will involve the 
identification of ways in which the FDNY has expanded its traditional capabilities for 
managing information in response to the events of 9-11, and again the goal will be the 
isolation of shortfalls or continuing needs.  Once the limitations of both the “traditional” 
(pre-9/11) and “new” (post 9/11) FDNY have been identified, Tier 4 will be an 
illustration of the importance of information in terrorism response through an analysis of 
the circumstances surrounding the events that involved the Twin Towers on 9-11.  Tier 5 
will involve an analysis of less dramatic but equally informative case studies illustrating 
successes and failures of the fire service in countering terrorism through information, 
intended to extract lessons of value.  Tier 6 will involve a comparative analysis of a 
24 
unique alternate system of sharing information, that employed by the State of Arizona, to 
ascertain if the Arizona system of managing information provides lessons for the City of 
New York.  Tier 7 is an analysis of the methodology adopted by the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD), a leader in the management of terrorism-related information, 
for sharing terrorism related information within its ranks.  Tier 8 will investigate the 
experience of the entire law enforcement community in addressing similar information, 
and information sharing, concerns.  Lastly, Tier 9 is the expansion of the concept of 
information to include a multi-faceted dimension that is new to the fire service, that 
known as intelligence.  In addition to the operational elements analyzed in tier fashion, 
the psychological implications of the perceived levels of information support are 
investigated as an independent concern, followed by a review of pertinent literature on 
the subject of information management.  Finally and importantly, concepts designed to 
support solutions are proposed for the FDNY based upon the needs identified in each of 
the earlier chapters. 
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V. TIER 1:  SURVEY OF FDNY RESPONSE AND 
MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL 
From November 2006 to February 2007 a comprehensive survey was conducted 
among active (presently employed) uniformed personnel within the FDNY.  The survey 
was developed specifically to provide informational support to this thesis.  The rationale 
for this survey is the presumption that respondents are likely to be the best source of 
information regarding challenges which they face regularly.  Those closest to the threat 
may provide the keenest insight into departmental needs, and may provide information 
that supports, or refutes, the basis of existing FDNY policies.  The development of the 
survey questions involved a peer review process wherein 6 individuals of various ranks 
reviewed the survey during the stages of development and provided input and 
recommendations.  The finalized survey was distributed to potential respondents via an 
internet-based survey website (“Zoomerang.com”) through the use of e-mail addresses.  
These addresses were obtained by way of a number of methodologies:  repeated visits to 
numerous widely disbursed firehouses in the solicitation of on-duty members; visits to 
FDNY fire academy classes attended by a geographical and hierarchal cross section of 
FDNY responders; and visits to administrative facilities where supervisory uniformed 
personnel were requested to participate.  In each case no preliminary direction was 
provided to potential respondents regarding the content or the intent of the survey.  
Participation was voluntary and responses were maintained strictly confidential.  The 
distribution of the survey was accomplished through standard e-mail delivery 
mechanisms.  Collection was controlled such that submission from each respondent (i.e., 
from each e-mail address) was limited to a single completed survey.  The majority of e-
mail addresses were personal (non-business) addresses, permitting most respondents to 
complete the survey at home.  Those targeted for participation included all ranks:  
Firefighter, Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion Chief (both operations (field) level and 
administrative), Deputy Chief (operations (field) level and administrative), and Staff level 
Chiefs.  Verbal feedback indicated that the survey required an average of approximately 
10 minutes to complete.  Based upon the mechanics of the distribution and receipt 
process, only one completed survey submission was possible per e-mail address, and only 
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one e-mail address was accepted per individual.  A copy of the entire survey and a 
graphical representation of results are included as an Appendix.  In total, 931 individual 
surveys were distributed to FDNY personnel.  Of these, 597 were “visited” (opened and 
viewed) by potential respondents.  Of this number, 533 were completed and submitted.  3 
respondents were determined to be inadmissible due to information that indicated that 
these respondents opened the survey and did not complete any portion.  Additionally, one 
respondent was the author and therefore inadmissible.  The sum total of FDNY 
respondents was 529 (it is noted that a relatively small number of surveys (27) were 
additionally distributed to Phoenix firefighters for comparison purposes.  Of these, 9 
completed surveys were received.  These results were not included in the various 
analyses described in this thesis).  It is further noted that consistent verbal feedback from 
potential survey-takers indicated technical impediments such as spam filtering prevented 
a significant number of potential respondents from being capable of “visiting” and 
completing the survey.  Despite this impediment, an overall return rate of 64.1% was 
achieved from among FDNY personnel. 
The specific purpose of the survey was multi-faceted.  Several questions were 
directed at the characteristics of the respondents; i.e., rank, number of years on the 
department, time in current position, number of individuals supervised, number of 
terrorist-based responses actually accomplished, and level of training relative to Haz-
mat/WMD (weapons of mass destruction) subject matter.  These questions are numbered 
1 through 7 in the actual survey (refer to the Appendix ).  The data obtained by these 
questions permitted a number of comparative and situational analyses, some of which 
have been conducted and which are described throughout this thesis in order to validate 
comments or reinforce specific conclusions.  It is noted that further exploitation of the 
data obtained by way of this survey is possible and it is recognized that the survey may 
thereby support additional or continuing research by others. 
It is observed that the level of support from the FDNY for terrorism-based activity 
as perceived by respondents would likely have both operational and psychological 
ramifications among the workforce.  Several questions were therefore developed with the 
intent of determining the perceived level of support for terrorism-based response versus 
fire-based response.  Responses specific to fire-based response (a relatively familiar and 
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therefore quantifiable parameter) are intended to serve as a “baseline” against which the 
perceived level of support for terrorism-based support could be measured.  These 
questions are numbered 10, 11, and 22 within the survey.  The informational parameters 
measured in this manner include the perceived quality of information (using indicators 
such as accuracy, timeliness, comprehensiveness, relevance, and usefulness) (questions 
10 and 11), and the value of information (question 22).  The findings regarding the 
quality of information are graphically displayed in Figure 7.  In summary, the findings 
indicate that the support recognized for fire-based response is of significantly higher 
quality than that recognized for terrorism-based response.  On average across all 
indicators, only 4% of respondents reported that the quality of fire based response was 
“not good at all” (question 11).  Contrarily, on average 44.2% perceived terrorism 
information as “not good at all” (question 10).  Furthermore, 74% of respondents directly 
indicated that they believed the department provided information of lesser value 
regarding terrorism versus fire.  Only 15% felt FDNY terrorism information was of 
higher value than FDNY supplied fire based information (question 22).  
The value of specific sources of information for firefighting personnel was 
investigated through question 20.  The metric provided to respondents regarding the 
varying sources was “value as it contributes to a level of awareness for responding safety 
and efficiency to potential terrorist events.”  The perceived value of sources of 
information from entities outside of the department (including televised news programs, 
documentaries, and newspaper and magazine articles) were compared to each other, and, 
more informingly, to that provided by internal sources of information (published 
department policies and procedures, fire academy classroom sessions, and firehouse 
drills).  Results indicate that the most commonly selected source of information for 
providing the “most value” to respondents was “televised news” (33% selected this 
choice), followed by fire department classroom sessions (20%), drills held in firehouse 
quarters (20%), televised documentaries (10%), published department policies and 
procedures (9%) and, least importantly, newspaper and magazine articles (7%).  
Reference is made to Figure 6 of this thesis.  A deeper analysis of the available data 
across the wide range of all responses (versus analyzing only those choices selected as 
“most valuable” and “least valuable”) was also conducted.  The weighted average of 
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ratings across all selections on a scale of 1 (most valuable) through 6 (least valuable) 
regarding the value of sources of information was as follows:  most valuable = televised 
news (3.2) followed by published departmental policies and procedures (3.3), fire 
department classroom sessions (3.58), televised documentaries (3.73), drills held in 
firehouse quarters (4.20) and lastly, newspaper and magazine articles (4.35).  In this 
manner the reported value of “published department policies and procedures” is observed 
to increase significantly when viewed across all responses; however, this source still 
remains less valuable to firefighters than televised news programs.  These televised 
programs tend to be concise and easy to assimilate.  This seems to suggest that an 
element of convenience and timeliness will enhance the attractiveness of information 
sharing methodologies to FDNY firefighters. 
The perceived relative importance of various categories of information was 
determined by way of question 8.  These categories of information included those most 
often related to fire-based response (building construction characteristics, age of 
structure, occupancy, security measures that may be present, and the number and location 
of potential victims) and those most commonly associated with terrorism-based response 
(immediate threats to an occupancy, history of threats to an occupancy, history of a group 
that may intentionally cause danger, danger of harm from intentionally released agents, 
and the likelihood of a release at a specific site).  Using a ranking scale of “very 
important,” “somewhat important,” and “not important,” the relative importance of these 
two informational predicates – fire and terrorism - may thereby be determined.  
Additionally, question 9 asked respondents to indicate how well the department supports 
their needs relative to each of these categories of information, using a scale of being kept 
“very well informed,” “somewhat well informed,” and “not well informed at all.”  A 
number of tendencies may be extracted from the data obtained from these questions.  
First, as derived solely from question 8, these two categories of information are perceived 
as of relatively equal importance (the average of fire-related characteristics cited as “very 
important,” “somewhat important,” and “not important at all” was 75.8%, 21.6%, and 
2.4%, respectively.  The average for terrorism-related characteristics was 72.8%, 22.4%, 
and 4.8%, respectively).  Given this, question 9 indicated that the perception of how well 
the department keeps personnel informed regarding each category varied significantly.  
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Ratings of support for fire-based categories as “very well informed,” “somewhat well 
informed,” and “not well informed at all” were 14.4%, 50.6%, and 35.0%, respectively.  
Terrorism-based categories received parallel ratings of 4.4%, 29.4%, and 66.2%.  
Reference is made to Figure 8 of this thesis.  It is clear that a very strong perception 
exists that there is lesser departmental support for terrorism based stressors than for fire 
based stressors. 
The perceived capability of the FDNY to organizationally obtain information 
from “outside” entities (such as the FBI and the NYPD) and to distribute it to the 
workforce was investigated by way of questions 12, 15, and 24.  Note that the ability to 
receive information (question 12) was considered as a separate concern than the ability to 
internally distribute it (question 15).  The perceived improvement of information sharing 
within the department since 9-11-01 was investigated by polling only those active 
members who were active in the FDNY at that time (question 24).  Again, results 
obtained by these questions provide insight and support to a variety of findings within 
this document.  Significantly, 90% of respondents indicated that they are either unaware 
of, or unsure of, a mechanism for the receipt of terrorism related information from 
entities outside of the FDNY such as the NYPD and FBI (question 12).  Similarly, 84.9% 
of respondents indicated that no entity within the FDNY is responsible for the receipt and 
distribution of such information to the workforce, or that they didn’t know of such an 
entity (question 15).  Clearly either an entity should be established, or any existing entity 
should better make known its existence (in fact, an entity does exist – see Chapter VII).  
In support of this determination, response to question 24 indicates that of those with the 
most experience on the department (those employed by the department prior to 9-11), 
43% feel that since 9-11, no improvement has been made in their ability to receive 
information important for safety and efficiency in response.  15% of the remaining 
respondents indicated that they were not sure of any improvement.  43 % indicated that 
improvement has occurred. 
The value of existing mechanisms of information sharing within the department is 
investigated in questions 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 25.  These questions specifically explore 
the extent to which the department encourages the observation and reporting of terrorism 
indicators (question 14), the extent of voluntary participation by responders regarding 
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information gathering and reporting (questions 16 and 17), the degree of specialized 
capabilities that reside within the FDNY workforce and the level of information and 
awareness on the part of the department regarding these capabilities (questions 18 and 
19), and the degree to which improved information regarding the construction 
characteristics of target hazard locations has been supported since 9-11-01 (question 25).  
Positively, 72% of respondents indicated that the department has encouraged them to 
observe, identify or report indications of terrorist activity (question 14).  This is believed 
to be the result of laminated “terrorism awareness” cards distributed by the FDNY Center 
for Disaster and Terrorism Preparedness (CTDP-described fully in Chapter VII).  This 
card provides simple information regarding potential terrorism indicators and a phone 
number to which reports may be made. It may be inferred from these results that effective 
solutions to specific needs need not be complicated or involved. Also positively, in 
question 16, 88% of respondents indicate that they have contributed to the sole source of 
information sharing that directly supports response activity, the Computer Information 
Dispatch System (CIDS), described more fully in Chapter VI.  This indicates a 
willingness and a capability on the part of responders to proactively engage in prevention 
and mitigation activity.  It also indicates the potential success of any systematic 
mechanism for information sharing within the Department.  However, the results of 
question 17 indicate that CIDS is not perceived as effective in the support of terrorism 
based response (63 % of respondents cited it as inadequate for this activity, and 16% 
were “not sure”).  Very importantly, in response to question 18, 30% of respondents 
indicated that they possess specialized skills or capabilities such as a Crane Operators 
license, a Professional Engineering license, Dive Master certification, tractor trailer 
license, etc….  Only 12% of these personnel, however, believe that the FDNY is aware of 
their skills (question 19).  The importance of this absence of information is discussed in 
various chapters within this document.  Simple observation, however, leads to a 
reasonable determination that the reliance of the department upon rank as a sole 
determinant for positioning may detract from the ability to capitalize on untapped 
resources within its ranks. 
In an attempt to support concepts elucidated within the thesis through a case study 
specific to the attacks at the World Trade Center, several questions are directed toward 
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determining the level of awareness on the part of those who responded on that fateful 
day.  These questions concern critical aspects of information including knowledge of the 
means of egress in the towers (question 26) and the type of construction that comprised 
the floors (question 27).  The presence or absence of this information, and the reasons for 
the state of knowledge that existed, are explored within the thesis in an attempt to identify 
shortfalls.  In short, it may be inferred from the results of these questions that the vast 
majority of those who responded on 9-11 were not familiar with the characteristics of the 
Twin Towers despite their pre-eminence as target hazards (77% reported being unaware 
of these characteristics, and an average of 10.5% indicated being only vaguely aware).   
The remaining questions in the survey are intended to provide a measure of the 
current general state of knowledge (or, conversely, ignorance) among FDNY responders 
regarding information and awareness.  Knowledge of the concept of intelligence as an 
independent entity is explored though question 13.  Interestingly, only 7 out of 530 
respondents (2%) were capable of accurately identifying all 5 commonly accepted 
components of the “intelligence cycle.”  A further attempt was made to determine the 
current general level of knowledge by asking respondents to selectively identify federally 
funded response assets available to support FDNY activities from a group of alternatives 
(question 21).  Of 5 alternatives, only two met the criteria of “a federally funded local 
emergency response asset that responds nationally.”  Despite this fact, all five were cited 
by significant numbers of respondents as meeting this criteria (60% provided one correct 
response, “USAR”), 57% cited DART (incorrect), 34% IMT (the second correct 
response), 32% NIMS (incorrect), and 17% CERT (incorrect).  It appears that a higher 
level of general awareness regarding federally funded support mechanisms is in order, 
indicative of the need for expanded information regarding all support functions. 
Lastly and importantly, a “comments” section was included at the end of the 
survey.  It was not a mandatory survey item and was designed to elicit information 
regarding past experiences and suggestions regarding information sharing within the 
FDNY.  The number of respondents who chose to provide comments was 112.  This rate 
of voluntary submission and the detail contained within many of the comments seems to 
indicate that information sharing as a subject matter is of heightened concern to a 
significant percentage of firefighters.  Additionally, the comments were generally and 
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decidedly negative in tone and most were highly critical of the existing department 
information sharing capabilities.  Furthermore, many individuals indicated that the survey 
served to increase their awareness of both departmental inadequacies and their own 




The survey conducted in the development of this thesis is unprecedented and 
enlightening.  It represents an attempt to obtain objective insight into the perceptions of 
the singular group that resides closest to the consequences of a terrorist event in New 
York City: the first response firefighter.  This is a perspective that is deserving of 
exploration, and which, due to an absence of research, is observed to have been 
neglected.  Due to a recognizable homogeneity within the operations of the 
approximately 30,300 fire departments within the United States,29 the survey results are 
likely to represent a broader perspective than the FDNY and therefore may serve a utility 
that extends beyond New York City.  As will be seen, the survey question results have 
been used to provide justification and validation for explorations made in the pursuit of 
better information management systems.  These results are also used to provide support 
for the conceptual solutions espoused within this document to address critical 
deficiencies.   
                                                 
29 United States Fire Administration, “Fire Statistics,” available at 
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/departments/, last accessed on March 3, 2007. 
33 
VI. TIER 2:  THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION AND WHAT IT 
HAS MEANT TO FDNY RESPONDERS  
This thesis is concerned with information management.  Information as a specific 
entity is difficult to quantify due to the broad scope of its potential applicability and the 
range of factors that contribute to its development and relevance.  Prior to a meaningful 
investigation of potential needs and the subsequent identification of solutions regarding 
information management it is necessary that the concept of information be more closely 
defined and understood in the context of the FDNY first responder.   
 
A. INFORMATION DEFINED 
 
A simplistic definition of information is found in Random House Webster’s 
College Dictionary: 
noun   knowledge communicated or received concerning a particular fact 
or circumstance30 
and in the North American Encarta Dictionary: 
definite knowledge acquired or supplied about something or somebody31 
Knowledge is observed as being intimately tied to information.  Anything that is 
known or may become known and which supports or enhances response efforts may 
represent important “information” for firefighting forces under the correct circumstances.  
The issue of relevance derived from the above definitions is therefore important. 
Information that is not relevant is not considered “information.”  Given the broad nature 
of this definition in relation to the needs of the fire community it is necessary to 
specifically identify types of information that may reasonably be expected to provide 
support for firefighting and terrorist related response.  In recognition of the critical 
mission of the fire department–rapid response and life saving–it is also important that  
 
                                                 
30 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, 2nd Ed. (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1997), 
670. 
31 North American Encarta Dictionary, associated with Microsoft Word processing program.  
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information determined to be supportive also be actionable.  Within these constraints the 
sources of relevant “firefighting information” in the FDNY have traditionally been 
limited to the following categories: 
• Information garnered through training, drilling, and operations 
• The content of published newspaper and magazine articles and books, and 
televised programs (passively available to responders during periods of 
non-response) 
• Information provided by way of departmental bulletins 
• Information contained within departmental policies and procedures 
• Information provided by the caller or transmitter of an alarm 
• Information obtained at the scene of a response through rapid interviews 
with occupants or others familiar with a given occupancy, and observation 
• Information that develops within the history of experience within a given 
firehouse, specific to an area or location, and passed from firefighter to 
firefighter through “oral tradition” 
• Fire-related information specific to an occupancy that is identified, 
captured and stored prior to a response and that is automatically 
disseminated to responding forces when an alarm is triggered for that 
occupancy.  The FDNY utilizes a specific automated system for this 
methodology, known as CIDS, and described in detail in a later chapter 
The first four categories listed above are essentially “background” sources of 
information that each support response in an indirect manner.  The remaining four 
categories represent information that directly influences response activity through the 
enhancement of situational awareness “on scene.”  The last category listed above–a 
system known as CIDS–currently exists as the sole source of pre-determined “captured” 
information that is provided in an automatic fashion by the FDNY to the FDNY in direct 
support of response efforts.  Traditionally the sources of information cited above have 
been juxtaposed with focused training and carefully selected equipment with the intent of 
permitting efficacious response to fire and various emergencies. 
 
B. INFORMATION METHODOLOGY WITHIN THE FDNY 
 
Given the sources of information described above it is possible to analyze the 
methodology by which the FDNY has traditionally prepared for response to emergencies. 
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The effectiveness of this methodology may then be determined.  Figure 3 has been 
provided as a visual aid in support of the following analysis. 
 
Figure 3. Traditional Use of Information by FDNY 
 
Effective response is predicated on a satisfactory amount of useful and actionable 
information.  Many types of information that serve firefighter’s needs are those that 
reside within his or her mind prior to response.  Other types of critical information are 
those that are obtained or made available only after the receipt of an alarm.  Both of these 
information types are depicted in Figure 3 (within the white shaded areas).   
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As may be observed in the inner white circle, the information immediately 
supporting “response” is that received on-scene after arrival, or during the act of 
physically responding.  For instance: once at the scene of an alarm a firefighter may 
recall past operations or stories he or she has heard specific to that occupancy through 
oral tradition (“I heard about this place…it has holes in the floor”); he may have obtained 
information from the person who reported the emergency (via telephone, for example); 
he may rapidly interview fleeing occupants and thereby obtain the location of victims 
within the building; and he may observe that specific information regarding the building 
has been provided automatically via a computerized database known as CIDS.  While 
critical, these sources of information - obtained on-scene or immediately prior to arrival – 
are by themselves inadequate.  They are necessarily complemented by other information 
of a less immediate nature, information that he or she obtained over time and prior to 
response.  This “background” information (depicted in white at the upper portion of the 
diagram) represent supportive elements that underpin firefighting efforts by enhancing 
the three pillars of emergency response: knowledge, skills, and equipment.  Information 
that prepares a responder on a personal level is primarily supportive of knowledge and 
skills.  Equipment is largely an organizational concern. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, information that exists as a backdrop to all responses 
(and which is therefore considered “background” information) is acquired through such 
mechanisms as the training academy, oral tradition within a firehouse regarding “the way 
we do things,” and the exploitation of the content of firefighting books and magazines.  
This type of information has traditionally been fire-centric, is general in nature, and is 
relatively “distant” from the immediacy of response in both content and time. A typical 
example of such information is, for instance, the physical and chemical properties of 
carbon monoxide (a by-product of fire). 
These two types of information are seen to support fire-based response in an 
identifiable and time-proven manner.  Analysis of Figure 3 in consideration of the new 
threat posed by terrorism permits the identification of shortfalls in this traditional support 
system relative to terrorist based response: 
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1. This methodology has evolved over time in response to the challenges 
presented by fire, as opposed to terrorism.  Many aspects of fire-based 
response are relatively predictable.  For example:  buildings are 
rectangular and possess compartments known as rooms; floors are 
interconnected with staircases; fire produces heat which rises; somewhere 
in the building is a fuel source that supplies either natural gas or heating 
oil.  It is observed that a preponderance of information that is critical to 
fire based response has become “known” or predictable within limits over 
the course of 150 years of experience, resulting in he need for a relatively 
simplistic information support network.  While the statement “you’ve seen 
one fire you’ve seen ‘em all” may represent an oversimplification, it 
nonetheless possesses a degree of accuracy.  Terrorism, on the other hand, 
is complex and highly unpredictable by nature, possessing “implicit 
unpredictability”32 and resulting in protective service professionals facing 
“considerable uncertainty with regard to the nature and magnitude of the 
problem they face.”33  Aside from the inordinate operational demands for 
information engendered by this unpredictability, terrorism presents special 
emotional challenges that hinder the ability to acquire and process 
information on-scene.  Actions with malevolent intent have been shown to 
have a much more powerful emotional impact than those which occur 
accidentally,34  and the decision makers at a terrorist incident (virtually 
every responder) experience such capability-limiting stressors as 
narrowing of vision, distraction and forgetfulness.35 
2. There is no inter-connectivity and therefore no consistency between the 
various sources of information that support the needs of responders.  For 
example, drills conducted at the firehouse are not related to or supportive 
of drills conducted between agencies, and neither of these is related to the 
education that takes place in the Fire Academy.  Another example is the 
fact that information discussed orally in the fire house is not 
systematically translated into bulletins or CIDS information.  The result is 
a fractured, uncontrolled and ad-hoc system of information dissemination 
without centralized control.  Consequences include inconsistent, 
incomplete, and gapped knowledge.  The simplicity and relative 
predictability of a fire-based response tolerates this mechanism of 
information management.  The complexity and unpredictability of 
terrorism based response, however, exceeds the capabilities of this system 
to adequately support information needs.  
                                                 
32 Douglas Paton and John Violanti, “Terrorism Stress Risk Assessment and Management,” Chapter 
17 in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 231. 
33 Ibid., 231. 
34 Larry Beutler et al., “The Need for Proficient Mental Health Professionals in the Study of 
Terrorism,” Chapter 3 in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 35. 
35 Helpguide.org, “Stress: Signs, Symptoms, Causes and Effects,” available at 
http://www.helpguide.org/mental/stress_signs.htm, last accessed on February 28, 2007. 
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3. The system of information management is passive in nature and does not 
encourage or support the proactive searching and incorporation of vital 
sources of information that may enhance knowledge and awareness. 
4. The system has no direct nexus to other entities that may provide 
additional information or alternate perspectives on existing information.  
Other entities include the New York City Building Department (for 
information related concerns) and the New York City Police Department 
and the FBI (for criminal/terrorist related concerns). 
5. Other than that afforded by CIDS, the system does not provide for the 
capture of information for future usage (i.e., retrieval capability) by 
response personnel and no formalized mechanism for true institutional 
learning.  The widespread reliance on oral tradition within the department 
for both background and “on-scene” incident related information is a 
reflection of inadequacy in this regard. 
6. The system does not utilize information to alter or direct such activities as 
training and planning on a short-term basis.  Training and planning are 
relatively static.  The information support system is therefore not a 
reactive “living system” of information and awareness but rather a fixed 
and inflexible methodology based upon tradition. 
7. The system of information management does not possess a methodology 
for maintaining information accurate, timely and complete. 
8. The system does not allow for the recognition of people within the 
department who possess specialized education or experience who might 
provide “added value” to information processing.  Survey results of active 
department members substantiate this fact.  63% of those who possess 
specialized skills report that the FDNY is either unaware of their skill or 
that they are not sure if the department is aware of their skill. 
9. The system does not provide for the transfer of information among and 
between managers and officers in different departments (such as the 
Bureau of Fire Prevention and the Bureau of Training), nor does it allow 
for a high degree of redundancy of information sharing.  For instance, if 
personnel familiar with a fact through oral tradition retire, that information 
is lost forever.  Similarly, relevant building construction information is 
collected by Fire Prevention but is not routinely shared with other bureaus. 
10. There is no mechanism for the development or use of a form of 
information known as intelligence, or expertise in this regard.  The 
concept of intelligence within the fire department is defined in Chapter XI. 
11. CIDS, as the sole mechanism for systematized information transfer to a 
responder, is a vital component in the FDNY support system. It is far from 
satisfactory, however, particularly for terrorist based response.  Survey 
respondents indicate that while 88% have actively contributed to the CIDS 
system, only 21% believe that it is adequate for terrorism related 
responses.  There is therefore only an incidental connection between the 
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CIDS information delivery mechanism and terrorism preparedness.  While 
often helpful, the information contained within the CIDS system is subject 
to the following critical limitations: 
• CIDS information does not exist for every building or occupancy 
in New York City, or for every target hazard location. 
• CIDS information is entirely dependent upon information that is 
voluntarily submitted by company officers who elect whether or 
not to identify hazardous or other notable conditions.  These 
officers may or may not observe such conditions during their 
normal course of business, may elect not to information, may 
simply not possess the time to address these issues, or may lack the 
skills to identify the critical nature of many conditions.  The 
absence of CIDS information related to the susceptible nature of 
the floors at the World Trade Center is a striking example (refer to 
Chapter VIII). 
• Many of the “aka’s” (“also known as”) within New York City, as 
well as many simple but commonly employed place names (such 
as “Macy’s”), will not trigger the release of CIDS information. 
Only the actual address or, in some instances, a place name, will 
activate the system.  Thus many responses that should be 
accompanied by CIDS information are not.  Furthermore, a mere 
misspelling of an address or name will fail to activate the system.  
• The company officers who constitute the heart of the system are 
untrained in subject matter outside of routine firefighting and 
emergency response.  Consequently, the identification of hazards 
related to specialized categories of information such as building 
construction, hazardous materials, or terrorist group indicators will 
often be absent, incomplete, incorrect or misinterpreted. 
• The information within the CIDS system is subject to obsolescence 
as undetected changes are made to the building or occupancy over 
time.  Incorrect information is often provided to responders, 
potentially increasing the hazards beyond those already present. 
• The information submitted by the company officers for inclusion 
in the database is condensed in format, but is not processed or 
analyzed to any degree prior to entry into the system.  No 
development or exploitation of “fire intelligence” takes place. 
• The CIDS system was developed in 1979 using outdated 
technology.  Development failed to anticipate the evolution of the 
department in terms of the nature and number of specialized units 
and has subsequently been overwhelmed with “white noise.”  Due 
to age and inherent technical limitations of this system, the 
quantity of information is limited to a maximum of 160 characters 
per occupancy (inclusive of “spaces”). 
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• Twenty specific examples of conditions that should be included in 
the CIDS system are enumerated in the FDNY Communications 
Manual, for the education of officers.  All are fire-centric; none 
refer to terror related conditions.36 
• The information must be read, comprehended and communicated 
by the company officer to his company during the response, 
typically a time period of less than 5 minutes, while he is 
simultaneously donning his protective gear, directing the 
operations of the chauffer (often in heavy traffic), and 
communicating and receiving critical information to the dispatcher 
via the department radio.  
It is observed that CIDS, while a useful tool for some fire or accidental 
emergency based responses, is not a uniform, consistent or completely reliable source of 
information, particularly for terrorist based response.  As an example, a typical CIDS 
response ticket that was printed for the World Trade Center response on 9-11 is 
illustrated in its entirety below.  It represents the sum total of information available to the 
firefighters regarding the structures they responded into. 
 
Figure 4. Actual Response Ticket Utilized by FDNY Engine 44 in Response to the 
World Trade Center, 9-11-01 
 
 
                                                  
36 FDNY Publications Office, “Critical Information Dispatch System (CIDS),” Chapter 4, 




The analysis of information as a concept within the FDNY prior to 9-11 supports 
the observation that the fire department behaved largely in a traditional manner that had 
developed in response to fire related stressors.  Information was delivered in identifiable 
and disparate “packages” in the support of response to various fire-based challenges.  In 
this manner information supply to the responder was singular in focus, ad-hoc and 
fractured.  The independent packages of information support that did exist were not 
supportive of each other.  No formal attention was directed at information as a separate 
and distinct entity diffused within the department, and no effort had been made to acquire 
information from outside the department.  Furthermore, a type of information known as 
intelligence played virtually no role in response or in the preparation for response.  The 
incidence of 9-11 changed the department in many ways.  Has it changed the 
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VII. TIER 3:  BEYOND TRADITION: HOW THE FDNY HAS 
CHANGED SINCE 9-11 
9-11 served as a wake-up call and a catalyst for change for the entire fire 
community.  The entirety of the experience surrounding that day in New York City 
provided an unprecedented opportunity to identify important lessons involving 
information management that will support future demands.  Calls for change in the 
traditional use of information, and subsequent changes, have occurred.  Have the right 
questions been asked, and are the subsequent changes adequate? 
 
A. FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
The attacks on the Towers were devastating in terms of civilian and responder 
casualties.37  Numerous investigations have been performed by several entities in the 
aftermath of that day in an attempt to identify problems, inadequacies, and gaps in 
existing knowledge.  These investigations are intended to enhance the safety, resilience 
and well being of our society as a whole, and to improve our understanding of the 
terrorist threat.  They include psychological studies of the terrorists, the victims, the 
responders and the affected communities; investigations into the efficacy of information 
sharing between federal agencies; and structural investigations to determine how and why 
the Twin Towers collapsed.  None of the studies are truly specific to the mechanics of 
emergency preparedness at the local level, despite the reality that these mechanics 
critically influenced the safety and well being of both victimized civilians and 
responders.  More specifically, none of the studies delve into the adequacy of local 
information sharing, management and control relative to the incident. 
The two significant investigative reports that involved an examination of local 
emergency responder capabilities in any regard are as follows: 
 
                                                 
37 2,749 individuals were killed at the World Trade Center on 9-11. 
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• The 9-11 Commission Report38 and subsequent recommendations 
represent a comprehensive review of the circumstances leading up to and 
surrounding the events of 9-11.  The focus of this study was on the actions 
of the terrorists themselves, the performance of the Federal homeland 
security apparatus, and a detailed description of the tactical response 
activities of the local agencies on that day.  It does not provide insight into 
the internal structure of the local agencies relative to information sharing 
and preparedness, nor does it study the needs relative to these issues.  It 
critically evaluated information sharing deficiencies among federal 
intelligence and criminal investigation assets (i.e., the CIA and the FBI), 
but essentially assumed a “kid gloves” approach to local agencies 
regarding similar concerns. 
• The McKinsey Report is more specific to activity at the local level.  It was 
conducted in order to identify deficiencies that exist within the FDNY 
(specifically), and the entire New York City emergency response system 
(more generally) as evidenced on 9-11. 39  The findings are intended to 
enhance future preparedness for major incidents.  The report concluded 
that the chief officers at the Command Post “had no reliable sources of 
intelligence,”40 and that “this lack of information hindered their ability to 
evaluate the overall situation.”41  It also indicates that the FDNY and 
NYPD “rarely exchanged information relative to command and control.”42  
Several key findings and recommendations are proffered by the report, 
and those relative to information management are contained within the 
sections designated “operations” and “planning and management.”  
Regarding “operations,” the report recommends improvements in the 
ability to obtain information from on-scene sources and agencies, improve 
inter-agency coordination and communications, enhance situational 
awareness, and develop specialized teams for specific responses.  It is 
noted that these improvements do not involve a systemic non-response 
driven improvement in the overall ability of the FDNY to manage 
information prior to an event, nor does it encourage the department to 
develop internal background support mechanisms.  Rather, it focuses on 
the direct support of response to specific incidents with specific personnel.  
Relative to the planning and management functions, the report is also 
largely response-centric but does offer the more systemically based 
important recommendation to “improve risk assessment through the 
creation of an FDNY risk database, with would compile information on 
                                                 
38 The 9-11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, N.Y., 2004). 
39 McKinsey and Company, Inc., McKinsey Report / Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness (New 
York, N.Y., September 20, 2002), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.html, 
last accessed on February 4, 2007. 
40 Ibid., 8. 
41 Ibid., 8. 
42 Ibid., 9. 
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unique hazards at specific locations, and … lead to the development of 
pre-plans.”43  This singular recommendation serves to support the search 
for solutions to some of the problems recognized by this investigation, as 
described in Chapter XVI.  
 
B. TERRORISM SPECIFIC INITIATIVES DUE TO 9-11 
 
The traditional response modality employed by FDNY personnel on a day-to-day 
basis has been analyzed.  Prior to 9-11 this standard operating philosophy and the 
mindset that it represented encompassed virtually all operations of the entire department.  
Since 9-11 important changes have been implemented in an effort to address the terrorist 
challenge while simultaneously continuing “business as usual.”  These initiatives are 
evolving rapidly and have received exceptional support from the FDNY administration. 
Progress has been made despite the tremendous challenges represented by the sheer 
number and complexity of terrorist potentialities and target hazard characteristics 
throughout New York City.  The various terrorism derived initiatives are described as 
follows and are illustrated, reflective of their nexus to the department, in Figure 6: 
• The West Point Counter-Terrorism Institute.  This classroom-based 
training program was developed in an effort to increase the level of 
awareness of selected mid-level Officers regarding the history, character, 
and operational methodologies of terrorist groups, particularly those 
deriving from radical Islamic extremism.  The curriculum is academic in 
nature.  Approximately 30 students pass through this program each 6 
months; approximately 150 officers have participated in the program.  The 
classes meet on a weekly basis and develop innovative solutions to 
problems that are designed to enhance FDNY operations.  Specific group 
projects are developed that are intended to provide “real world” solutions 
to terrorist related problems that the Department faces. 
• The Fire Officers Management Institute (FOMI).  The upper ranks of the 
FDNY are not filled with individuals who have achieved success as 
typified in the business world, that is, by way of higher education and 
successful experience in the management of personnel, finances, and 
infrastructure.  Rather, these individuals have achieved their rank by 
passing a series of focused one-day exams at intervals during the course of 
their careers.  For example, a chief responsible for the borough of 
Manhattan would be required to pass 4 examinations that were all derived 
from the same “set of books.”  These exams, while comprehensive and 
                                                 
43 McKinsey and Company, Inc., McKinsey Report / Increasing the FDNY’s Preparedness, 17. 
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extremely challenging, have been developed primarily to ascertain how 
successful an individual is in the science of the extinguishment of fire and 
the provision of emergency and rescue services.  Elemental management 
skills form a very small percentage of the material studied.  The exams do 
not measure the acumen of an individual in the completion of tasks related 
to the efficient implementation of business practices.  In recognition of 
this fact and in a post 9-11 environment that saw the FDNY interact with 
many relatively sophisticated entities for the first time, the department 
began a program to educate chief officers in order to enhance business and 
communication skills.  This unique initiative is provided through a 
partnership with General Electric and Columbia University.  
Approximately 80 chief officers had participated in this program prior to 
2007.  Each class is tasked with the completion of several projects 
intended to advance the management capabilities of the Department. 
• The FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP).   
This very significant recent development within the FDNY is the result of 
a realization that an exceptionally dedicated and focused effort must be 
made to prepare the FDNY as an organization for the potential for terrorist 
attack.  It is also designed to support response to natural hazards of all 
types.  This group is comprised of three separate entities: 
1. Exercise Design.  A Chief Officer who specializes in exercise 
design manages this program, designed to develop dedicated 
(singular) exercises for response personnel.  He is augmented 
largely by personnel who have received special training in exercise 
design and who are drawn from the field on a temporary and “as 
needed” basis.  Exercises are performed inter-departmentally 
among field units at selected target hazard sites, as well as 
collaboratively with other agencies.  Table-top, functional, and full 
scale exercises have all been utilized as preparedness aids.   
2. Emergency Response Planning.  This program is dedicated to the 
development of plans for responding to predictable extreme events 
and circumstances.  Information that pertains to a potential threat 
with a relatively high potential for occurrence or an occupancy 
designated as a target hazard is gathered from a variety of sources 
through dedicated and focused research and development efforts.  
Plans are then developed for the deployment of FDNY resources to 
these events and locations.  Examples include the FDNY Bio-Pod 
Response Plan, Collapse Response Plan and the Improvised 
Explosive Device Plan. 
3. Risk Assessment.  New York City is replete with target hazard 
locations of every conceivable nature.  This program is intended to 
develop a database containing as much information as possible 
regarding the nature and characteristics of especially vulnerable 
locations and populations.  Special projects include the analysis of 
vulnerabilities for bridges and tunnels, for instance.  It is intended 
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that ultimately the database information will be automatically 
accessible to incident commanders during response activity 
through the use of sophisticated wireless computerized equipment. 
4. Additionally, the CTDP has forged informal relationships with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) that are designed to improve 
information sharing capabilities with the Federal Government. 
• The Development of Incident Management Teams (IMT’s).  Following 9-
11 the FDNY established a Type 2 Incident Management Team.  This 
development was in response to recommendations deriving from the 
McKinsey Report “Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness.”44  The intent of 
these recommendations was to provide specialized, highly trained 
personnel who use Incident Command System (ICS) principles to manage 
large and complex incidents.  Training was provided to selected Chief 
Officers from the FDNY in two week long classes provided by the United 
State’s Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forestry Service branch.  
Selection is based upon rank – Chief Officers comprise the team structure.  
Two 35 member teams have been trained and may be deployed 
nationally.45 
• The enhancement of Haz Mat and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
capabilities.  The FDNY has significantly bolstered the capabilities that 
can be activated in the event of a singular, or multi faceted, WMD event.  
The size of the Haz Mat response group in terms of personnel has 
increased by a factor of over 400%.   Prior to 9-11 the response capability 
consisted of 14 units (approximately 400 personnel) whose members were 
trained to the Haz Mat Technician level or higher.  Since 9-11, 
approximately 1200 personnel have received this training and the number 
of Haz Mat related units has expanded from 39 to 139.  The support 
mechanism for these units has grown by a factor of 800%.46  Growth has 
included equipment, apparatus, and response personnel.  Associated with 
and in support of this development has been the production of several new 
directives and protocols regarding new operational challenges facing the 
FDNY.  These include methods of decontamination and accomplishing 
specialized entry for search and extrication. 
• The procurement of levels of clearance by FDNY personnel and the 
establishment of an FDNY presence on the New York City Joint Terrorist 
Task Force (JTTF).  The aftermath of 9-11 witnessed an increased level of 
concern regarding terrorism on the part of individuals in the upper echelon 
of the Department.  Six of these headquarters-based personnel obtained 
                                                 
44 McKinsey & Co., Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness.  
45 Ronald Spadafora, “Origin and Development of FDNY Incident Management Teams – Part 1,” 
WNYF Magazine, 4th issue of 2003, 16-17. 
46 Figures were obtained in a personal interview with Battalion Chief Robert Ingram, Chief of Haz 
Mat Operations, Randall’s Island, N.Y., conducted on 12-21-06. 
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security clearances during this time period, as did the two representatives 
of the FDNY on the New York City Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) 
(two Fire Marshals).  These Fire Marshals attend monthly meetings with 
the JTTF and provide the details of any information deemed relevant to 
the command staff of the FDNY.  Immediate concerns are conveyed to 
headquarters personnel without delay; concerns without time demands are 
conveyed at weekly meetings with the security-cleared command 
officers.47 
• The attendance of FDNY personnel in the federally funded Naval Post 
Graduate School Master’s Degree Program in Homeland Defense and 
Security.  A small number of officers have attended this 18 month 
program.  Most of the initiatives cited above have been implemented or 
significantly bolstered by these personnel.  In this regard the impact of this 
program on the Department has been unprecedented.  It has served as a 
broad based support mechanism for many departmental needs and will 
therefore not be considered as a separate entity.  Its value is observed in all 
of the initiatives illustrated in Figure 6. 
The relationship of these initiatives to the methodology of information support 
within the department is illustrated in Figure 5. 
                                                 
47 Interview by author, FDNY Fire Marshal Patrick Campbell, liaison to NYC JTTF, Queens, N.Y., 
October 18, 2007. 
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Figure 5. Information Support System, Post-9/11 FDNY 
 
The well-intentioned initiatives described above are in the process of evolving.  
They have undoubtedly advanced the general level of awareness regarding terrorism on 
the part of a limited number of the 2,468 Officers that supervise the FDNY, have 
increased the response capabilities for WMD events, and have resulted in the 
development of response plans for several of the target hazards in New York City.  As 
indicated by Figure 5, however, it may be seen that these initiatives have not addressed 
the need for a holistic information management system.  The initiatives have simply 
supplemented the existing information sharing methodology, and marginally so.  
Importantly, the improvements include the implementation of two new pillars of 
informational preparedness: planning and risk assessment, as delivered through the 
CTDP.  They have also provided a closer tie to the intelligence community through the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force.  Note, however, that these improvements are independent of 
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response related personnel and their activities.  It is clear from both survey results and 
interviews with knowledgeable field and management level personnel that the 
improvements that have been made have been accomplished in a vacuum relative to field 
personnel, and that they pertain to issues perceived as being unrelated to day-to-day 
response activity.  For instance: 
• A question was asked regarding the value of different sources of terrorism 
related information to FDNY personnel as pertaining to safety and 
efficiency in response (question 20).  Options included televised news and 
documentaries, published department policies and procedures, newspaper 
and magazine articles, fire department classroom sessions, and firehouse 
drills.  As stated in Chapter V, the source of information most frequently 
identified as “most valuable” was “televised news and documentaries” 
(33% of respondents). Among the least valuable of sources was 
“published departmental policies and procedures” (9% of respondents) 
(see Figure 6).  It is interesting and possibly useful to note that written 
sources fared poorly relative to more visual and interactive sources of 
information.  The department may wish to consider this observation in the 
development of future programs, so as to include a higher degree of visual 
and physical interaction in training programs. 
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Figure 6. Relative Value of Information Sources for Safety and Efficiency in 




















































































































































• In questions designed to identify the perceived quality of information for 
terrorist response provided by the department relative to that provided for 
fire response (questions 10 and 11), a virtual inversely proportional and 
extreme relationship was found to exist, as reflected in Figure 7.  The 
percentage who rated terrorism as poorly supported was approximately 
equivalent to the percentage who rated fire support as very good.  Five 
indicators of quality were identified: accuracy, timeliness, 
comprehensiveness, relevance, and usefulness.  Respondents were asked 
to rate fire and terrorism related support, respectively, as “not good at all,”  
“just ok,” or “very good” for each indicator.  On average, fire related 
information was observed to be perceived by 46.6% as “very good” across 
all indicators.  Conversely, terrorism related information was rated by 
only 6.2% respondents as “very good.”  An average of 44.2% of 
respondents considered the quality of terrorism information to be “not 
good at all.”  Only 4.0% placed the quality of fire related information into 
this same category.  Note: the figures in Figure 7 represent the total 
number of respondents for each indicator of quality. 
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Figure 7. Quality of Information Based Upon Various Indicators: Terror Related 






































































































• Information support provided by the department relative to the importance 
of fire and terrorism based parameters was investigated by asking 
respondents to first rate the importance of various parameters, and then 
describe the perceived level of support for each of those parameters.  Four 
fire related parameters, and six terrorism related parameters, were 
provided to respondents.  The ratio of the number who cited a parameter 
as “very important” to the number who cited that parameter as “not well 
informed at all” was significantly higher for terrorism related parameters 
than for fire related parameters (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Rating of Departmental Support Relative to Importance of Information: 










































































Why does a divergence exist between the various post-9/11 terrorist driven 
activities of the FDNY (described earlier in this Chapter) and the recognition of these 
activities at the responder level? 
The immediate answer to this question appears to be complex and multi-faceted.  
Among the most likely reasons for divergence between action and recognition are the 
following factors: 
• Initiatives that promote pro-activity by response personnel in functions 
that support terrorism resistance are absent.  These include the 
identification, observation, reporting, planning, and sharing of information 
at the field level.  Importantly, these types of activities, if implemented, 
would serve to support the development of what will herein be defined as 
“fire intelligence” (refer to Chapter XIII).  In their absence no fire 
intelligence occurs.  Those with the most potential in terms of mitigation 
and prevention activity are also those with the most to lose in the event of 
an attack – the first response firefighter.  Despite these incentives for 
activity the average firefighter is virtually excluded from terrorism driven 
initiatives. 
• The selection of officers for the West Point Counterterrorism Institute, 
Incident Management Teams, and the FOMI program is extremely limited 
given the small class sizes relative to the large number of personnel within 
the FDNY.  Less than 15% of the Officers in the department have 
participated in these programs.  Furthermore, the subject matter in these 
programs is largely non-specific to terrorism responder support issues, is 
historic or sociological in nature, and is largely unrelated to the concepts 
of developing or obtaining information or intelligence.  Lastly, the vast 
majority of the well-intentioned projects developed by attendees of the 
West Point and FOMI programs, intended to bolster aspects of response 
capabilities, are not acted upon by the administration.  After the final 
demonstration of each proposed project is provided to command personnel 
(including the FDNY Fire Commissioner), in most instances no further 
action is taken to implement the proposals and no feedback is provided to 
the groups regarding the status of their proposals.  The Institute, therefore, 
has limited impact on response and preparation for response, is not 
associated with systemic information management or control within the 
Department, and fails to “close the deal” on the implementation of its own 
projects. 
• Relative to the operations of the Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness (CTDP):  these operations are orchestrated by a small group 
of officers that operate in relative obscurity from the response entities of 
the Department.  Excellent work is being accomplished and great potential 
exists within this group.  What value does such work hold if it is not made 
available to the “troops”?  The reality of the impact of the CTDP on the 
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Department as a whole is reflected in survey results that indicate that 
84.9% of response personnel are unaware of the existence of a dedicated 
“terrorism information” group (see Figure 9).  Furthermore, an analysis of 
the efforts of the Center – such as site-specific drills and development of 
response plans for specific events - show that they are not directed at the 
“typical” firefighter involved in day-to-day response, but rather at 
inordinate vulnerabilities and threats.  Additionally, the risk assessments 
are not currently “deliverable” to incident commanders in the field due to 
technical and procedural limitations.  Lastly, the number of risk 
assessments performed are minimal relative to the many target hazards in 
New York City.  The CTDP, while effective in many of its objectives, is 
therefore not effective in providing holistic systemic enhancements to 
prevention and response capability in the department.  It does not 
capitalize of the ability of the individual firefighter to contribute to the 
counter terrorism mission, nor does it measurably support the needs of the 
average firefighter.  Why the limited effectiveness?  Simply stated, the 
Center cannot do everything.  This is not the fault of any individual or 
entity; however, the limits of the Center are dictated by a shortfall of 
personnel and, in the words of Chief Joseph Pfeifer (the Director of the  
 
Center), inadequate “capacity.”  Given the potential consequences of 
inadequacy the bolstering of “capacity” appears in order, in terms of 
funding, resources and personnel.  
• Regarding the form of information known as “intelligence” (further 
described in Chapter XIII), several impediments to efficacious and holistic 
availability have been identified:   
• The sole mechanism that is available for formally interfacing with 
other agencies in a pre-incident capacity – the JTTF – is 
distinguished by an absence of representation of FDNY response 
personnel. 
• The current system of gathering intelligence is not associated with 
an established mechanism to disseminate or share information 
within and throughout the department, particularly at the “field” 
level.  
• The “rank and file” is unaware of the existence of the relationships 
described above and has not seen tangible evidence of an effective 
and reliable means of obtaining and disseminating information, 
including intelligence and fire intelligence.  This fact is strongly 
corroborated by the results of survey question 12.  92.2% of 
respondents are unaware of an organized structure for the transfer 
of terrorism information from other entities (such as the NYPD and 
FBI) to the FDNY (see Figure 9). 
58 
 
Figure 9. The Level of Awareness of FDNY Personnel with Regard to Terror 


































































































































































































• The two members of the FDNY who have been provided positions within 
the JTTF are not associated directly with FDNY response personnel but 
are rather Fire Marshals, former firefighters who have been trained to 
emphasize law enforcement related concerns rather than those that involve 
responder considerations.  The Fire Marshal ranks number approximately 
100, less than 1% of the responder population of the department.  They are 
also distantly removed from the response-directed personnel in terms of 
administration, work location, and chain-of-command, as depicted in 
Figure 5.  Fire Marshals are tasked with the investigation of fires among 
other administrative duties. They are not operational personnel and as such 
they correspond directly with “management” rather than “the field.”  The 
present system is therefore, at best, an indirect method of intelligence 
transfer to the “end user” (response personnel).  It is also a methodology 
that remains invisible to the “rank and file” (those most likely to be 
critically impacted by an event). 
• The adequacy of FDNY representation on the JTTF in terms of sheer 
numbers is poor.  The NYPD commands 120 representatives on the JTTF.  
Contrarily, two seats are provided to the FDNY.  A ratio of 60 to 1 is not 
likely to be optimal for adequate relationship-building, redundant 
communications, visibility and accessibility.  If all participants in the 
JTTF from all agencies are considered, the FDNY ratio falls to a fraction 
of a percent.  Greater FDNY exposure will improve effectiveness.  The 
Arizona model of agency interaction is evaluated in this context for 
comparative purposes (see Chapter X). 
• There is no provision within the current system of intelligence control for 
the development of fire related intelligence by members of the FDNY and 
the sharing of such information with outside agencies.  Field level 
response personnel possess unique knowledge and skill sets and are 
involved with response and building inspection activity on a day-to-day 
basis.  They become intimately familiar with the neighborhoods that they 
respond in and develop contacts with the people they serve.  The absence 
of a means of developing information and readily sharing it will reduce the 
potential for the early detection and prevention of terrorist activity. 
• Lastly, the improvement of Haz Mat/WMD capabilities, while 
tremendously valuable for response in the event of an unorthodox terrorist 
attack, have not been accomplished in a manner that is associated with 
prevention or increased awareness.  Analysis of survey results that 
compare those who possess advanced Haz Mat training to those who do 
not shows no appreciable difference in the percent who believe that the 
quality of terrorist information is “very good” (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Quality of FDNY Terror Information as Perceived by Haz Mat Trained 
















































































































The investigative studies of significance surrounding 9-11, paralleling the 
requirements contained within the relevant government directives, have not truly 
addressed the potential contribution of firefighters to preparedness and prevention at 
either the local agency or interagency level.  Emphasis of these investigations and their 
recommendations has been on response related activity alone and has been inconsiderate 
of the need to better obtain and manage terrorist related information, and to encourage 
prevention as a core function.  Furthermore the initiatives instituted by the FDNY since 
9-11 are novel and well intentioned improvements in preparedness but fall short of truly 
enhancing the awareness of the average firefighter in his daily routine as he awaits the 
next terrorist event.  It is also quite obvious from survey results that these organizational 
initiatives are considered inadequate by those they are designed to support - response 
personnel within the department.  This has operational and psychological implications for 
these responders.  Operational implications are relatively self-evident and described 
throughout this document.  Psychological implications of the absence of awareness are 
discussed in Chapter XIV of this report. 
It appears that despite the events of 9-11 the United States and New York City 
will be satisfied with a consequence management role and the FDNY has been 
constrained by this expectation.  Is this what is best for the FDNY, the city, and the 
country?  It also appears that the FDNY has continued to use information in a manner 
that does not holistically address terrorism.  An example of the dire consequences of a 
collective mindset that focuses on response to the relative exclusion of information 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
63 
VIII. TIER 4:  9-11, AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
Critical evaluation of the circumstances that foreshadowed and influenced the 
events of 9-11 is a necessity in any study of local responder preparedness.  Previous 
studies have failed to penetrate “into the weeds” of the event and thereby failed to derive 
lessons that are truly useful to local response assets.  As stated in the New York Times 
Bestselling Book 102 Minutes, “If history is to be a tool for the living, it must be 
unflinchingly candid.”48  The facts surrounding the events of 9-11, while complex when 
viewed en masse, upon deconstruction reveal a relatively uncomplicated explanation as to 
why thousands of people unnecessarily died in the towers versus the hundreds who 
necessarily perished in the zones of aircraft impact, and why a staggering number of 
firefighters were committed into structures doomed to fail.  The collapse of the Towers 
was not an unpredictable phenomenon.  A strong argument may be made that it was 
highly predictable based upon the nature of construction and the science of firefighting as 
understood on 9-11.  It was, however, unpredicted, due to an organizational failure to 
identify and collect a variety of causative factors in a deliverable fashion prior to the 
event.  Comprehension of this rationale necessarily begins with the history of the Towers, 
and derives from two complimentary influences:  the willingness and latitude of the Port 
Authority during the late 1960’s to pursue inexpensively constructed buildings at the cost 
of unknown performance in fires, and the ignorance of the New York City Fire 
Department relative to the hazards resulting from this unregulated conduct.  The primary 
lessons to be learned by the fire service include those which identify any commonality 
that underlies deficiencies in information management that contributed to the loss of life. 
The information of concern in this investigation is not that which developed on scene on 
the morning of 9-11; rather, it is information that developed since the moment the Towers 
were conceptualized, a period of approximately 40 years.   
Among the myriad of information-related factors that may be examined to derive 
“lessons learned” for the fire department are those that most directly contributed to the 
successful nature of the attacks on a local level, and those that contributed directly to the 
                                                 
48 Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, 102 Minutes (New York, N.Y.: Times Books, 2005), 251. 
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massive death toll of both civilians and responders.  These factors include information 
deficiencies relative to the history and nature of construction; the impact of information 
from the 1993 attacks on the preparedness of the FDNY in 2001; informational 
coordination between the various response agencies; and the use of information in pre-
incident planning and preparation. 
A notable consideration that underscores the value of each of the following 
observations is the fact that the World Trade Center had been clearly identified as a target 
hazard many years before 9-11.  This fact was dramatically illustrated by the depiction of 
the targeting of the Two Towers to illustrate the cover of the U.S. Department of Justice 
textbook that was used nation-wide from 1997 to 2001 to prepare responders for terrorist 
events (see Figure 11).49  Sadly and ironically, many of the firefighters who died on 9-11 
had studied from this text. 
 
 
Figure 11. Cover of U.S. Department of Justice Textbook Utilized by First 
Responders Prior to 9-11. 
                                                 
49 U.S. Department of Justice, Student Manual, Emergency Response to Terrorism, Basic Concepts: 
Fire & EMS (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1997), cover. 
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A. HISTORY AND NATURE OF CONSTRUCTION 
 
The structural nature of the Towers was unique in many ways.  An understanding 
of the uniqueness of these structures in light of the decisions made on 9-11 will reinforce 
the argument that information management is critically important both on the scene of an 
incident and in the days, months and years preceding an event.  By necessity the 
succeeding analysis is detailed and specific in nature. 
Quite simply, in the construction industry weight coincides with cost.  Very 
typically, the lighter a structure, the cheaper it is to construct.  Even a small amount of 
research in support of a simple calculation by a concerned individual may have served to 
provide firefighters with information that supported a more reasonable response.  
Although it will not be found in published literature, each of the Towers, had they been 
constructed with a solid mass of balsa wood, would have outweighed the actual structure 
as it stood in place.  The Towers were a fraction of the weight-per-cubic foot of earlier 
high rise structures.  Building owners understand the relationship between mass and cost; 
building engineers and architects consider it within the design process.  Conversely, 
firefighters intuitively correlate mass with fire resistance.  Several of the unique measures 
taken by the Port Authority in the pursuit of lighter and thence cheaper structures, and 
their ramifications, are described herein. 
Most fundamentally, the structures were permitted to be designed and constructed 
without the mandated constraints of a building code, at the discretion of the owner, due to 
privileged constitutional exception.  Bi-state agencies such as the PANYNJ are exempt 
from conformance to local laws; the Building Code is a local law.50  Such a provision 
does not exist under “normal” circumstances.  Building Codes are predicated at the most 
basic level on occupant life safety.  Therefore, this unique historical allowance formed a 
legal and organizational hurdle divergent from the mission of the fire department – fire 
and life safety – which could not be eliminated, mitigated, or circumvented at the time of 
construction.  The buildings were subsequently constructed, by design, to a lesser 
standard than would have been permitted by the New York City Building Code in effect 
                                                 
50 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade 
Center Towers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 2005), 53. 
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at the beginning of the design process (as described below).51  Several of the fire 
prevention measures utilized were unsubstantiated in performance.  Despite voluntary 
“conditional” promises to the contrary,52 the Port of New York Authority (now Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ)) did not adhere entirely to provisions 
of the Building Code in effect at the time.53  The construction and design were therefore 
beyond the control of the fire department.  What remained within the control of the 
FDNY, however, was the ability to observe and to maintain records over time relative to 
the nature of construction, and the ability to disseminate such information to the response 
units.  A survey of FDNY firefighters indicates the fact that the unique nature of the 
towers was unknown to a high percentage of response personnel, including Chief 
Officers, despite the widely recognized status of the towers as target hazards (refer to 
Figures 9, 10, and 11).  This absence of information resulted in dire consequences during 
and after the attacks of 9-11.  In the realization that the “devil is in the details,” a few of 
the factors related to this concern are described as follows: 
 
1. Floor Construction 
The floors of the Twin Towers were constructed with lightweight steel parallel 
chord trusses that spanned a distance of 60’.  At the time of construction the use of such 
trusses was unique and unprecedented in high rise construction (the Towers were, for a 
time, the tallest structures in the world).  Data regarding the anticipated performance of 
the World Trade Center Tower floor trusses under fire conditions was non-existent due to 
an absence of testing (despite building code requirements to the contrary).  The fire 
resistance of the floors was therefore unknown and efforts to determine it were neglected.  
This fact combined with the absence of fire sprinklers in the buildings for over 20 years54 
provides insight into the design considerations related to fire safety.  Importantly, the 
                                                 
51 The design process was initiated using the 1938 NY City Building Code.  During the design process 
the Port Authority notified engineers to revise the design by utilizing provisions of an anticipated new code, 
ultimately published in November of 1968 (The 1968 NY City Building Code).  The design was therefore 
partially in conformance with this newer Code. 
52 Internal FDNY memo, Applicability of Local Law to the Port of New York Authority, Honorable 
Robert. O. Lowery, Fire Commissioner, to Samual Sheres, Deputy Fire Commissioner, March 6, 1969. 
53 1938 New York City Building Code. 
54 FEMA, World Trade Center Building Performance Study, 2-12. 
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trusses were instrumental in the initiation and progression of Tower collapse (described 
below).  Prior to 9-11 and over the course of many years the use of steel trusses had 
become associated with a significantly increased danger of firefighter fatality due to the 
frequency of collapse incidents.  These trusses were most commonly encountered by 
firefighters as roof beams in “taxpayer” type occupancies,55 under an identical loading 
condition as seen in floor construction (i.e., vertical loading).  The preponderance of 
documentation within the fire service regarding trusses was based upon this load 
condition.  Numerous publications by firefighting experts had decried the exceptional 
hazards represented by this modern method of constructing floors and roofs,56 to the 
extent that the saying “Beware the Truss” became a commonplace reference in 
publications and training.57  This statement and the rationale behind it were repeatedly 
emphasized in FDNY departmental protocols and bulletins in effect on 9-11: 
• Failure of one truss element can cause a failure of the entire truss.  This in 
turn may pull down a number of trusses, in a domino effect which will 
cause the entire roof, or a large portion, to collapse.  Failure can occur in 
the early stages of the fire.58 
• Trusses are composed of smaller and lighter weight members and they 
span greater distances than the conventional roof beam construction.  Fire 
will affect them more rapidly.59 
• When these steel beams are heated from 1000 (deg.) F to 1500 (deg) F, 
their yield strength drops dramatically and they start to soften and fail.  
This temperature can be reached in five to ten minutes at a fire and it is 
only a matter of time at an uncontrolled fire (thirty minutes for the smaller 
beam sections), until these beams can be heated beyond their strength 
limitations.60 
• Some of the warning signs that will signal a potential structural collapse 
during firefighting operations are: 
                                                 
55 A taxpayer occupancy is FDNY jargon for a one or two story commercial occupancy, usually a 
storefront, common throughout N.Y. City. 
56 Chief Vincent Dunn, FDNY (ret.) is among the most prolific experts on the hazards of truss 
construction as observed in such publications as Collapse of Burning Buildings: A Guide to Fireground 
Safety (Saddle Brook, N.J., Penwell Publishing, 1988), and numerous articles, including “Building 
Construction and Collapse,” WNYF Magazine, 4th issue of 1999, 7-9. 
57 FDNY Publications Office, “Beware the Truss,” Safety Bulletin 85, Gypsum Roof Decking, (June 
25, 2001), 1. 
58 FDNY Publications Office, Firefighting Procedures: Taxpayers (October 6, 2000), 5. 
59 Ibid., 5. 
60 Ibid., 9. 
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Heavy body of fire which has been burning out of control for 20 
minutes or more, particularly in a large open floor area. 
Inability to make successful headway against a heavy fire 
condition within 20 minutes into the operation at a fire.61 
 
• “Beware the Truss”…open web steel joists are found in modern 
commercial structures.  They are used to span long distances (up to 60 
feet).  Unprotected lightweight open web steel joists are vulnerable to high 
temperatures and may collapse within 5 to 10 minutes in a heavy fire 
situation.62 
• Truss roofs are not designed nor constructed to be used as a Fire 
Department working platform.  Early collapse of a roof must be 
anticipated in a heavy fire condition and members should not be 
committed to roof operations.63 
• A significant element of the Incident Commander’s size-up, is to 
determine the length of time of burning.  When fires are advanced and 
headway cannot be made, be prepared to evacuate the roof, withdraw 
interior units and initiate an exterior attack.64 
Some of the worst incidents involving firefighter fatalities had involved metal 
trusses, including the 1941 Brockton, Massachusetts Strand Theatre Fire (13 fatalities) 
and the Wichita, Kansas auto dealership fire (4 fatalities).65  Consequently and as noted 
above, at the time of the 9-11 attacks FDNY standard operating procedures for truss roof 
buildings disallowed extended operations on single-story buildings of this construction.  
How, then, were hundreds of firefighters permitted to enter and operate for an extended 
period of time in 110 story structures that possessed this unusual characteristic?  The 
missing portion of the equation that corresponds risk to reward–the fundamental equation 
at every emergency response–was the absence of information as it pertained to the 
unusual and untested construction characteristics of these target hazard buildings.  Given 
the knowledge of massive fire conditions and the likelihood of exposed steel elements on 
the fire floors, awareness on the part of the incident commanders regarding the presence 
                                                 
61 FDNY Publications Office, Firefighting Procedures: Taxpayers (October 6, 2000),  16. 
62 FDNY Publications Office, “Safety Bulletin 85 – Gypsum Roof Decking” (June 25, 2001), 1. 
63 FDNY Publications Office, “Safety Bulletin 85,” 2. 
64 Ibid., 2. 
65 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths 
of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System Failures (NIOSH Publications Dissemination, Cincinnati, OH, April 
2005), 19. 
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of steel trusses would have caused them, by virtue of experience and departmental policy, 
to alter their methodology.  No such alteration was made.  As determined by survey, 
77.8% of the respondent FDNY firefighters who were employed by the department prior 
to 9-11 and who worked in the immediate vicinity of the towers were unfamiliar with the 
construction characteristics of the floors (Figure 12).  Based upon this survey a similar 
percentage of firefighters who worked remote from the towers (outside of the 1st 
Division) - 77.0% - were unfamiliar with floor characteristics (also Figure 12).  
70 
 
Figure 12. Familiarity of Pre-9/11 Firefighters with Floor Construction, WTC 





























































Percent of respondents unfamiliar with floor construction
71 
What of the respondents who comprised the command structure prior to 9-11, in 
particular?  A relatively high percentage of Fire Chiefs who were involved with FDNY 
field operations prior to 9-11, the most important decision makers at the scene, reported 
being unfamiliar with these construction characteristics of the buildings (66% - see 





















Figure 13. Field Level Chief Officers Prior to 9-11: Familiarity with Floor 
Construction at WTC 
 
Ignorance of structural characteristics is also reflected in the perspective of the 
single surviving Safety Battalion Chief (of three who responded).  These Chiefs are most 
responsible for overall safety evaluation at an incident scene.  Safety Chief Michael 
Telesca, a survivor of both Tower collapses, reported that none of the Safety Chiefs were 
familiar with the floor construction or building egress characteristics.66 (A familiarization 
drill at the Towers involving these Chiefs had been scheduled several months prior to 9-
11.  It was summarily cancelled as a result of a fire in lower Manhattan, and was never 
rescheduled).  The floors have been found to have been complicit in the early collapse of 
                                                 
66 Interview by author, FDNY Safety Chief Michael Telesca (ret.), Yonkers, N.Y., September 20, 
2006. 
72 
the structures through the assumption of a heat derived catenary (sagging) shape and a 
resultant inward force on the exterior columns, initiating an instability type failure.67  
Experience indicates that conventional steel beams would not have behaved in this 
manner.68  Therefore, the ignorance regarding the presence of trusses was accompanied 
by a mindset among responders that the building elements were conventional elements 
and therefore would behave differently.  The observed mechanism of failure had never 
been experienced in conventionally constructed buildings, and no steel framed structure 
had ever collapsed, despite several wide area uncontrolled fires with similar temperature 
extremes in high rise buildings of steel frame construction.  Most notably, these past fires 
far exceeded the duration of the fires in the Two Towers (56 and 102 minutes, 
respectively).  A few examples of these past fires are as follows: 
• A 1991 fire in Philadelphia involved nine floors of a 38 story office 
building and raged for 18 hours without collapse.  Two firefighters were 
killed by smoke inhalation69 
• A 1988 fire in Los Angeles involved five floors of a 62 story office 
building and raged for 4 hours without collapse.  One civilian was killed70 
• A 1970 fire in New York City involved two floors of a 50 story office 
building and raged for 5 hours without collapse71 
Notes:  
1. Each of these buildings was constructed during the same time 
period (within 5 years) of the World Trade Center towers.  All 
used conventional steel framing methodology versus the novel and 
untested methods employed in the towers 
2. The extent of structural damage from aircraft impact on 9-11 was 
unknown to responding FDNY personnel.  Importantly, the NIST 
investigation determined that the impacted structures would have 
continued to stand in the absence of fire72   
                                                 
67 NIST, Final Report, 150, 152. 
68 As observed in numerous past fires, some described below. 
69 Harvey Eisner and Bill Manning, “One Meridian Plaza,” Fire Engineering Magazine, August 1991, 
51-70. 
70 Harvey Eisner, “Towering Inferno,” Firehouse Magazine, October 1988, 51-58. 
71 John O’Hagan, “One N.Y. Plaza: An Architects Dream-A Firefighter’s Nightmare,” WNYF 
Magazine, 1st Issue 1973, 4 – 9. 
72 NIST, Final Report, xxxvii.  
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3. Problems associated with the failure of the NYPD to share their 
observations with firefighters on scene were critical to evacuation 
and have been well documented.  “The FDNY, as well as the Port 
Authority Police, were never provided with the information that 
the NYPD possessed.”73 
Given the above information it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the first 
responders - including line officers who made decisions for single companies and Chief 
Officers responsible for multiple companies - were ignorant of information regarding the 
presence of failure-prone trusses with uncertain fire resistance at each floor level.  The 
information that was available and upon which decisions were made was necessarily 
based upon the previous experience of steel framed high rise buildings when exposed to 
fire – a resistance of multiple hours without collapse.  In concert these factors are likely 
to have contributed to an over-commitment of resources.  Had the characteristics of the 
floors been investigated and captured prior to the incident, and subsequently disseminated 
to those on-scene– an easily conceivable derivative of a pro-active information collection 
and sharing network–the operating tactics would likely have been altered.  At the very 
least, a basis for sound decision making would have been available.  A reasonable tactic 
based upon this information would have involved a reduced number of more mobile 
firefighters being committed to enter the Towers, possibly for limited evacuation 
purposes rather then for firefighting. As stated regarding 9-11: “the concept of 
‘situational awareness’–using modern tools to provide information needed by people 
making life-and-death decisions in fast moving environments–had become a foundation 
for military maneuvers, air-traffic control, power plant operations, and advanced 
manufacturing.  That concept had not taken hold at many fire departments, including 
New York’s.”74  In the absence of significant organizational improvements in the five 
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2. Egress 
Each tower was provided with three stairways designed to provide emergency 
evacuation routes.  Each of these stairways was enclosed with gypsum based panels that 
achieved a fire rating of 2 hours, and all were relatively closely spaced within the core.  
Contrarily, the Building Code in effect at the inception of the design process,75 had it 
been utilized, would have required a minimum of seven stairways, widely dispersed, and 
protected by concrete masonry units (concrete block) with a fire rating of 3 hours.  The 
difference between what would have been constructed in a “normally” code compliant 
building (prior to 1968) and the protection chosen by the PANYNJ in terms of both blast 
and fire resistance is significant and was contributory to the death toll.  The staircases 
were limited in number and their relatively close spacing, and lightweight walls, caused 
all to be heavily damaged.  Impact compromised stairways have been indicted as the 
reason why virtually all viable building occupants above the point of aircraft impact – 
estimated at over 1,250 people76 – were unable to escape the Towers.  The fact that 18 
people who were above the impact zone in Tower 2 managed to negotiate the singular 
(barely) passable staircase and survive further reinforces the criticality that code-
compliant stairways would have represented to the hundreds trapped at the top of each 
building.  Importantly, as determined by survey, 43% of current firefighters who worked 
in the immediate vicinity of the Towers (i.e., First Battalion firefighters) prior to 9-11 
reported that they were unfamiliar with the location, size, nature and number of exits 
from the buildings (see Figure 14).  19% were only vaguely familiar.  The percentage 
who were unfamiliar among pre 9-11 surveyed firefighters who did not routinely respond 
into this location as a result of distance (i.e., non-First Battalion firefighters) was even 
greater – 78% (see Figure 15).  It is observed that the actual responders on 9-11 likely 
possessed unrealistic expectations regarding the nature and number of staircases, and 
therefore an incomplete understanding of the nature of evacuation assistance that would 
be required. 
                                                 
75 1938 New York City Building Code. 
76 This number has been linearly extrapolated from figures provided within the NIST Final Report 
wherein occupants on the impact floors were not differentiated from those above.  In arriving at the figure 
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Figure 14. Pre-9/11 First Battalion Responders and Their Familiarity with Means of 






Figure 15. Pre-9/11 Firefighters Outside of the First Battalion and Their Familiarity 
with Means of Egress in WTC Towers 
 
3. Fireproofing 
Measures taken by the PANYNJ include the fact that the material used to 
fireproof the lightweight steel truss-supported floors - sprayed fire resistant material, or 
SFRM - was unprecedented in high rise construction,77 was untested, and with a 
                                                 
77 NIST, Final Report, 69. 
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thickness that was chosen arbitrarily and without a basis in technical knowledge.78  
Furthermore, the use of the 2 hour fire rating chosen as the basis of design was 
significantly less than the 3 hour fire rating required by the 1938 Building Code.  
Remarkably the fireproofing that was used was never actually tested against this 
(reduced) fire rating.79  The reduced (design) fire rating was therefore complemented by 
an absence of information as to whether this lesser rating could be met.  The 3 hour fire 
rating was standard for high rises constructed from 1938 to 1968.  Based upon the survey, 
the presence of a lesser fire rating on inordinately slender steel members was likely to 
have been unknown to a high percentage of firefighters who responded into the Towers.  
These personnel would naturally assume a longer resistance to fire based upon the 
“standard” thicknesses observed during their firefighting careers.  The fireproofing 
situation can therefore be reasonably assumed to have been misleading to the responders 
relative to the period of time that the buildings would remain structurally sound, based 
upon their experience with high rise construction.  The absence of this information 
presumably increased the potential for over-confidence in the structures, and resultant 
over-commitment.  A factor that must be considered is the contribution of the damage 
that occurred to the fireproofing prior to collapse, a consideration not present at the 
earlier fires.  It is now known that the fireproofing was likely compromised by the impact 
of the aircraft, resulting in a lesser degree of fire resistance on many of the floor trusses 
than had been characteristic of earlier hi-rise fires.  It may therefore be argued that the 
impact of the aircraft was an unprecedented contributor to an early fire-induced collapse, 
lessening the importance of information regarding what type of fireproofing was present.  
It is noted, however, that the significance of this factor in the minds of the responders 
would reasonably be mitigated by several observations: 
• The more typical cementitious fireproofing is hardier and more likely to 
have survived impact pressure and fragmentation.  Thoughtful responders 
would likely have assumed survival of the fireproofing based upon the 
natural expectation that it was cementitious. 
• The conditioned assumption of the presence of steel beams by responders, 
versus lightweight trusses, was significant.  Steel beams would tend to 
provide a much larger and more uniform surface area for adhesion of the 
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fire-proofing material, and more protection due to dissipation of the blast 
wave.  Responders would naturally predict a better potential for survival 
of the fire-proofing than actually occurred. 
• The behavior of conventional steel roof and floor beams in Building 5 of 
the World Trade Center Complex indicates that heavily impacted and 
unprotected steel beams (versus trusses) will sag rather than collapse 
under fire conditions.  This building suffered complete burn-out of 
contents over a period of several hours.  Despite this fact, collapse did not 
occur.80  Such behavior had also been observed prior to 9-11: for instance, 
in the Broadgate Phase 8 fire in the United Kingdom in 1990, unprotected 




The factors cited above are illustrative of numerous examples of poor information 
management that are likely to have contributed to the devastation of 9-11.  Although 
extreme, the circumstances of this event are suggestive of a potentially high level of 
ignorance on the part of firefighters to all responses.  This ignorance is more 
understandable and, arguably, unavoidable for “ordinary” structures due to their vast 
numbers and minimal attraction as targets.  It becomes especially problematic, however, 
when considered with regard to pre-determined target hazard structures such as the World 
Trade Center Towers.  The events of 9-11 highlighted a particularly significant and 
unnecessary void in the realm of knowledge possessed by firefighters.  This void may be 
reasonably concluded to have caused over-commitment, inadequate mental preparation, 
and relative pre-incident complacency on the part of the firefighting forces.  A system 
designed to collect and analyze critical information prior to a response, combined with a 
capability for sharing it with on-scene responders, would have served to reduce the dire 
consequences of that day.  The value of specific information to responders is dramatically 
illustrated by these events.  As determined by survey, the level of awareness on the part 
of many firefighters regarding the construction characteristics of any target hazard  
 
 
                                                 
80 Federal Emergency Management Agency, World Trade Center Building Performance Study (New 
York, N.Y.: Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc., September 2002), 4-12. 
81 Ibid., A-9, A-10. 
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location in New York City has not improved appreciably since 9-11.  Only 52% of 
respondents report being more familiar with the characteristics of any target hazard 
location since 9-11 (survey question number 25). 
 
79 
IX. TIER 5: CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
A. CASE STUDIES 
A compilation of recent terrorist related events associated with the fire 
community provides additional real life examples of the impact of information 
management capabilities on firefighter effectiveness, preparedness and safety.  Each of 
these circumstances may be analyzed to determine the criticality of the fundamental need 
for observing, collecting, archiving, protecting and sharing terrorist-critical information.  
These examples are as follows: 
• In the early 1990’s design drawings from the construction of the World 
Trade Center towers were knowingly but unwittingly provided by high-
level personnel within the FDNY Commissioner’s Office to an individual 
who was later discovered to be an accomplice and disciple of Sheikh 
Omar Abdel Rahman (the Blind Sheikh), a primary figure in domestic-
based Islamic terrorist activity at that time.  The individual in receipt of 
these drawings was also a trusted employee of the FDNY.82  The details 
surrounding the release of these documents to this individual indicate an 
absence of awareness of the utility of their content.  Although not known 
with certainty, it is entirely possible that the building plans were 
fundamental to an understanding of the building structural systems by the 
perpetrators of both terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (1993 and 
2001).  Such an understanding on the part of the terrorists would 
dramatically increase the potential for destruction and structural collapse 
during an attack.  The need to recognize, and protect, critical information 
is apparent. 
• The Republican National Convention was held in New York City in the 
summer of 2004.  A portal-type radiation detector was situated over the 
city-bound lanes of the George Washington Bridge by Port Authority 
personnel in an effort to detect and interdict shipments of radioactive 
material that could be used malevolently.  The presence of this detector 
was not brought to the attention of FDNY personnel.  On the eve of the 
convention the system detected the passage of vehicle-borne material 
emitting a significant amount of radiation.  The vehicle of concern was not 
immediately identified due to the large number of vehicles which passed 
the detector simultaneously–in fact, identification was accomplished only 
after two days (the emitter was determined to be innocuous).  Of 
significance was the fact that a large number of FDNY personnel had been 
positioned in and around the mid-town Manhattan area during this time 
period in conformance with an emergency action plan for the Convention.  
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The departmental plans were therefore inconsiderate of the potential for a 
radiation alarm and required adjustment “on the fly.”  A system of 
information sharing, based upon established relationships and trust and 
familiarity, would have enabled the foreknowledge of detectors prior to 
the event.  Preparation and response plans would have been subsequently 
altered.  The need to establish trusted relationships with other agencies is 
made clear by these circumstances. 
• In 1995 Ramsi Yousef, the mastermind behind several large-scale terrorist 
plots and attacks (including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing), was 
in the process of constructing explosive devices in a plot to destroy 
multiple international airliners in flight.  This plot was discovered during 
this “bomb-making” stage as a result of an incidental chemical fire in his 
Manila apartment.83  Numerous and volatile pre-curser chemicals were 
present in the occupancy of the bomb makers; despite this fact, the 
responding firefighters failed to detect the intent and significance of the 
activities.  They left the scene in a routine manner.84  An observant and 
insightful police officer pieced together the indicators and returned to the 
scene, resulting in the arrest of an accomplice of Ramsi Yousef and 
disruption of the plot.  Ramsi Yousef fled the country and remained at-
large, ultimately being captured in Pakistan.  Increased awareness on the 
part of the firefighters, through a concerted education program, may have 
resulted in earlier detection and a more successful and complete 
interdiction on the part of police personnel through the interdiction of 
Yousef.  It is apparent that a sense of heightened awareness, and 
recognition and identification skills, are essential among fire personnel. 
• In April of 2006 an Engine Company with the Seattle Fire Department 
conducted an impromptu building inspection based upon the observation 
of potentially unsafe conditions at a building that had formerly been 
occupied as a Mosque.  This inspection for fire related hazards resulted in 
the discovery of hundreds of military chemical and biological hoods in an 
occupancy that would not normally house such items.  Recognizing this as 
a potential indicator of terrorist activity, the officer notified the Seattle 
Police Department who in turn notified the FBI.  The officer also provided 
names and contact phone numbers for occupants who may have been 
involved with the procurement and storage of the masks.85  This case 
study illustrates the benefits of awareness, detection skills, and pro-
activity within a fire department. 
• Over time a large number of interdictions of criminal activity have 
resulted from standard firefighter activity.  These events indicate the value 
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of firefighters as potential detectors of terrorism. Most of these events 
occur in relative isolation and subsequently the significant potential of this 
mechanism remains largely unrecognized. Two very recent examples 
include the discovery of a cache of horded mail (20 sacks) within the 
Queens, N.Y. residence of an errant postal worker as a result of the 
response of firefighters to an odor of smoke.86  Another recent example is 
the discovery of a massive hydroponic marijuana growing facility in an 
apartment in Brooklyn, discovered as a result of an otherwise typical 
response of firefighting units to a water leak.87  Firefighters respond 
everywhere and it is apparent that such response is a continual opportunity 
for interdiction. 
• The World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993.  One of the principal 
investigators of the structural damage following these attacks was Mr. 
Edward Wallace, a Registered Architect who was also a detective with the 
NYPD.88  Detective Wallace had been identified by the NYPD early in his 
career as an individual with unique architectural skills.  Based upon these 
skills he was assigned to the Crime Scene Investigations unit, a position he 
maintained at the time of the 1993 attacks.  Immediately after the attacks 
NYPD Commissioner Kelly assigned Detective Wallace to investigate the 
bombings.  During this process Detective Wallace became intimately 
familiar with the construction characteristics of the entire complex.  He 
also identified critical locations of damage that jeopardized police officers 
involved in rescue operations, and presented this information to 
Commissioner Kelly and many Commanders.  The endangered officers 
were promptly removed.  Detective Wallace thereafter maintained copies 
of the construction drawings (blueprints) for the Towers at his home. 
Although not on the scene following the 9-11 attacks, Detective Wallace 
witnessed the attacks on television.  Upon observation of the extent of fire, 
and based upon his knowledge of the construction characteristics, he 
determined immediately that the Towers were in danger of imminent 
collapse as a result of fire load and poor fire resistance of major structural 
elements.  Detective Wallace repeatedly attempted to convey this 
information to the Incident Commanders at the scene but was unable to 
reach them via telephone.  The experience of Wallace, while not 
consequential in this instance due to his inability to contact the incident 
commanders, stands as testimony to the value of having uniquely qualified 
individuals in possession of specific information prior to an event.  It also 
indicates the need for reliable communications equipment in the hands of 
such individuals.  The failure of the NYPD was simply one of 
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communications: the agency had taken definitive steps over many years to 
improve its reservoir of information and had identified a critical human 
asset (a Registered Architect).  Contrarily, the failure of the FDNY was 
three-fold: information management, asset identification and 
communications.  Detective Wallace was knowledgeable, experienced and 
capable of obtaining specific and actionable information.  He was 
identified as an asset.  The New York City Fire Department did not take 
such proactive measures but returned to “business as usual” as it awaited 
the next attack.  Had similar steps been initiated by the FDNY in 1993 
(notably, similarly experienced individuals existed within its ranks) – the 
complexion of the response on 9-11 may have been different.  Critically, a 
survey of FDNY personnel indicate that only 12% of those FDNY 
respondents with specialized skills (such as a rigging certification, crane 
operator’s license, and professional engineering license) indicate that the 
Department is aware of these skills (survey question numbers 18 and 19). 
• The FDNY has shown a remarkable inability, or reluctance, to identify 
and utilize key resources that it can leverage in the fight against terrorism.  
An absence of information regarding the value of these assets reduces the 
resistance of New York City to the effects of an attack.  An example that 
illustrates this point derives from a federal program to assist local 
governments.  The department supports a specialized FEMA sponsored 
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Force.  Federal funding for the 
New York City Task Force (NY TF-1) amounted to $ 3,596,264 in fiscal 
year 2005.  Nationally, FEMA spent $ 60 million on the entire task force 
system in each of FY 2003 and 2004.89  In the days and hours following 
the attacks of 9-11 USAR Task Forces from around the country reported 
into the various command posts to notify FDNY command personnel as to 
the availability of their expertise and equipment.  Many of these teams, 
due to the fact that their existence was unknown to the FDNY officers in 
command and who materialized in a highly stressful environment, were 
ordered to “stand down” 20 blocks away from the site while relatively 
untrained volunteer firefighters and civilians “worked the pile.”  Several 
Structural Specialists (a specific task force position) from Indiana Task 
Force 1, New Jersey Task Force 1, and elsewhere reported amazement and 
disappointment at the alarming absence of awareness on the part of the 
FDNY to recognize their rescue counterparts.90  Simply put, information 
regarding the nature of these task forces was unknown to the FDNY 
Chiefs who assumed command, despite the fact that New York City itself 
had staffed such a team for over 10 years.  The unknowing chiefs were 
primarily and necessarily interested in site control through a reduction in 
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the size of the workforce, and accountability.  They did not possess the 
time or the inclination to become educated about the federal task force 
concept while conducting operations.  Many of the disciplined task forces 
obeyed the standby orders until it became apparent that their expertise 
would not be utilized as a result of ignorance on the part of the incident 
commanders – a delay of several days.  They then self-deployed to 
perform functions that they themselves deemed appropriate to their level 
of training and expertise.  Critical information – specifically awareness of 
the federal USAR system – that was available to only a small number of 
FDNY personnel to the exclusion of the remainder of the department 
resulted in a delayed and fractured federal response effort.  Other 
problems continue to exist with this Task Force.  The composition of the 
membership is drawn from only the Special Operations Command (SOC) 
division within the FDNY–limiting the pool of talent to less than 5% of 
the workforce.  Furthermore, several key positions are not filled with 
personnel who meet minimum qualifications.  This is partially a 
consequence of the fact that NY TF-1 is the only task force in the country 
that is fully self-staffing:  that is, as a rule it fills all positions from within 
the FDNY, NYPD and EMS ranks. Therefore, requirements for the 
“Structural Specialist” position such as a Professional Engineering (P.E.) 
license or Registered Architect’s (R.A.) License and five years of 
experience in the analysis, design or investigation of structures.91 often 
cannot be filled from within these ranks.  Ironically, although such P.E.’s 
do exist within the department, this fact remains either unknown or 
unrecognized by the command hierarchy.  Qualified individuals are not 
given the opportunity to participate; rather, those selected meet criteria 
that is undefined, unregulated, and highly unorthodox.  Training of task 
force members on structural related subject matter is also delivered by 
personnel who lack requisite qualifications, a circumstance that pre-dated 
9-11 and remains extant.  Other task forces necessarily pursue certain 
types of expertise outside of the municipal agencies that govern their 
structure and therefore fill these positions in accordance with minimum 
standards.  The circumstances accompanying the management of NY TF-1 
call into question the entire oversight mechanism regarding federal 
spending for homeland security initiatives.  They also stand in stark 
contrast to the recommendations of both the World Trade Center Building 
Performance Study and the NIST post-9/11 reports, which call for an 
increased level of collaboration and training between structural and fire 
protection engineers and response personnel as a result of the limitations 
in structural knowledge evidenced by fire personnel on 9-11.92,93   
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• A series of deadly bombings took place in the London subway system on 
July 7, 2005 at 8:50 AM (during rush hour).  These bombings occurred at 
2:50 AM eastern seaboard time (EST).  Despite the potential for 
coordinated attacks and the similarity of New York and London as 
attractive potential targets for radical Islamic extremists, no early 
notification of the London bombings was made to any of the 350 units 
within the FDNY.  On-duty responders remained unaware of these 
bombings until approximately 9 AM EST, a period of 6 hours.94  Those 
firefighters who had not yet learned of the events via the morning 
newscasts were informed through a teleprinter message at that time.  In the 
interim time period many units city-wide had participated in responses, 
ignorant of the heightened threat potential.  A similar situation was 
observed in the absence of notification to the FDNY regarding information 
long known by the NYPD concerning attacks on the subway system on 
specific identifiable dates (October 5 and 7, 2005).  A source determined 
to be reputable had indicated that explosive devices were to be utilized in 
the attacks.  In response to this information Mayor Bloomberg stated: 
"We believe that there is some credibility to this, and if I'm going to make 
a mistake you can rest assured it is going to be on the side of being 
cautious."95 
• Despite these assurances, fire department response personnel learned of 
this threat on the eve of the targeted day, through televised news 
programs.96  If a mechanism for inter-agency information sharing existed, 
it was not utilized. 
• In another series of events novel bombing techniques were utilized to kill 
civilians in Baghdad, Iraq, on February 21 and 22, 2007.  In the first 
incident a large chlorine tanker was exploded; in the second, a pick-up 
truck carrying chlorine cylinders was detonated.97  Many people were 
killed or injured.  On February 22, 2007 a chemical munitions and bomb 
assembly plant stocked with propane cylinders and “ordinary chemicals” 
was discovered near Fallujah.98  Despite the recognition of new tactics and 
the potential for copy-cat or related attacks on US soil, no rapid 
information collection, analysis or even notification was evident within the 
ranks of the FDNY.  In the days immediately following these attacks 
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available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/10/07/newyork.subways/index.html, last accessed on February 
7, 2007. 
96 Personal Interview with Firefighter Edward Kennedy, Engine 44, New York, N.Y., October 7, 2005. 
97 Sebastian Abbot, et al., “Attacks Using Chlorine Gas Trucks Underscores Threat of Chemical 
Bombs,” International Herald Tribune, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=4689579, last 
accessed on February 22, 2007. 
98 Ibid. 
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information was obtained by firefighters from the evening news.  
Importantly and for the first time, on February 27, 2007 a 
“Counterterrorism Information Bulletin” on this subject was distributed by 
the CTDP in conjunction with the routinely published and widely 
disseminated “Department Orders.”  Entitled “Terrorism Awareness – 
Improvised Chemical Weapon Attacks in Iraq” this document serves to 
both alert and inform the operational elements in the department of the 
newly recognized threat.99  Although a potentially critical delay of 6 days 
ensued after the initial causative incident, this distribution represents a 
novel positive step taken by the department to recognize and address 
emerging threats at the “field” level.  This mechanism will support the 
conceptual recommendations for solutions as proposed in Chapter XVI of 
this thesis. 
• On October 11, 2006 an aircraft carrying New York Yankee pitcher Cory 
Lidle and a flight instructor crashed into a high rise building on the upper 
east-side of Manhattan.100  Subsequent investigations proved that this 
incident was accidental in nature.101  In the immediate aftermath of the 
crash, however, the potential for terrorist causation was recognized by 
both the NYPD and the FDNY.  Subsequently, the incident was treated by 
the NYPD as a terrorist event.  The FDNY attempted to respond in routine 
fashion.102  NYPD dispatched hundreds of heavily armed officers to the 
scene and placed a “lock-down” on a significant portion of Manhattan.  
The FDNY response, as reported by the first arriving FDNY Officer on 
the scene (Lt. Ed Ryan, Engine 44), was characterized by an absence of 
information that led to significant confusion on the part of firefighting 
forces: 
• The building was “missing” 10 floors (consecutive floor level designations 
transitioned from floor 12 to floor 23 without the presence of actual 
intermediate floors).  This practice is uncommon, but not unheard of, in 
Manhattan where real estate perceived to exist at higher elevations 
possesses greater market value.  This unique but critical numbering system 
was unknown to fire department personnel, was not included in CIMS, 
and resulted in significant confusion for forces within the building 
attempting to locate the “fire apartment.”  It also severely challenged 
communications between those inside the building and those observing the 
building from the exterior, who commonly count window openings to 
identify the fire floor.  This confusion included communications with the 
                                                 
99 FDNY, Counterterrorism Information Bulletin: Improvised Chemical Weapons in Iraq, distributed 
with “Department Order Number 18,” dated February 26, 2007. 
100 Maria Newman and William Rashbaum, “Yankee Dies in Plane Crash, Official Says,” New York 
Times, October 11, 2005, 1. 
101 Matthew Wald, “Inexperience Noted in Yankee’s Plane Crash,” New York Times, Metro Section, 
February 6, 2007, B3. 
102 All information regarding this response was obtained from first arriving FDNY Officer Lt. Ed 
Ryan, Engine 44, interviewed by the author, New York, N.Y., February 7, 2007. 
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Incident Commander, as reflected in taped records of the on-scene audio 
transmissions.103 
• The apartment which suffered aircraft impact was actually a very large 
combined apartment wherein three individual occupancies had been 
conjoined by the removal of partition walls.  This fact was unknown to the 
fire department personnel and was not included within CIDS.  The 
location of maximum fire was actually distant from the point of impact.  
Significant confusion resulted from the nature of the apartment layout in 
terms of locating and extinguishing the fire. 
• Supportive (“second due”) firefighting forces were significantly delayed 
by the NYPD lockdown procedures, and the movement of firefighters at 
the scene of this accident was hindered by security measures emplaced at 
street level by the NYPD.  Security-related obstruction of firefighting 
forces continued after fire extinguishment was accomplished, hindering 
access to location such as the Command Post.  This impediment existed 
partially as a result of an absence of information sharing between the 




Analysis of these varied case studies allows for the identification of critical 
capabilities within the fire community that have proven to be beneficial to the counter 
terrorism effort (if present) and harmful (where absent or incomplete).  Unfortunately, 
much of the experience has been defined by inadequacy, and the successes have been 
largely incidental (the result of chance).  The necessary capabilities derived from these 
case studies that are deserving of specific attention are as follows:   
• An awareness of the necessity to maintain and protect important 
information and to constantly maintain a defensive posture (as observed in 
the failure of the FDNY to secure important documents) 
• The necessity of developing systemic information sharing capabilities with 
information gatherers, and the importance of a “trusted network” of 
communication (as evidenced by the absence of inter-agency information 
sharing during the 2004 RNC Convention) 
• Recognition and identification skills at the field level concerning terrorist 
activity indicators (successfully observed in both Seattle and New York 
City) and awareness of the need to convey such information to the 
appropriate authorities 
                                                 
103 FDNY Bureau of Communications, Audio transmission record of 9th Battalion Chief recorder, 
Alarm Box 1031, Manhattan, October 11, 2006. 
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• The need for firefighters in all places and at all times to be situationally 
aware of terrorist indicators, including during seemingly routine 
emergencies (as elucidated by the Manila incident) 
• The absolute necessity for the FDNY to acquire and share information 
regarding world-wide terrorist events with the response units as rapidly as 
possible.  Delay could equal death.  The inability to satisfy this need, as 
observed in the New York City subway case studies, has had serious 
potential implications for responders 
• The ability to gather information prior to an event and to “operationalize” 
this information, as evidenced by the Cory Lidle event, wherein critical 
information that was retrievable (the floor numbering system) remained 
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X. TIER 6: ARIZONA COUNTER TERRORISM INFORMATION 
CENTER (ACTIC) 
One of the recently established fusion centers in the United States is the Arizona 
Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC).  ACTIC is unique in the extent of 
involvement of fire department personnel in the activities of the center.  For this reason–
as well as the recognition by many in the national law enforcement and firefighting 
communities that it is a highly effective fusion center–it was chosen for analysis intended 
to identify policies and procedures that may help address some of the deficiencies 
associated with the use of intelligence and information by the FDNY. 104  The 
information below was obtained primarily through an interview of Captain Rick 
Salyers,105 Phoenix Fire Department, who was instrumental in the establishment of the 
mechanisms described below. 
ACTIC is a state-sponsored entity comprised of 43 local, state, federal and 
military agencies.  It has established mechanisms for obtaining, capturing, sharing and 
disseminating information to improve both general awareness and situational awareness 
at an incident scene. 
The development of ACTIC occurred in evolutionary stages.  Initially the ACTIC 
utilized a “collection plan” system, common to many fusion centers, wherein information 
that meets certain pre-determined criteria is garnered from routine police reports by 
“Terrorism Officers” and placed within an information repository intended to serve future 
needs. “Terrorism officers” were police officers who did not necessarily possess security 
clearances and were untrained in intelligence matters.  Over time police patrol personnel 
became familiar with the criteria of concern to the “Terrorism Officers” and earmarked 
certain information on the reports in order to make identification and extraction easier. A 
second group of individuals known as “Intelligence Officers,” on the other hand, 
                                                 
104 For instance, investigation of ACTIC as a model was recommended by Eric Lamar, International 
Association of Firefighters (IAFF).  ACTIC activity has also been contributory to several thesis, including 
William Forsyth, State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative Approach in Modeling A 
State Fusion Center (Monterey Ca.: NPS, September 2005), and Alicia Welch, Terrorism Awareness and 
Education as a Prevention Strategy for First Responders (Monterey, CA: NPS, March 2006). 
105 Captain Rick Salyers, Phoenix Fire Department, interviewed by author, Phoenix, AZ., December 7, 
2006. 
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concentrated solely on conducting vulnerability assessments of fixed facilities.  These 
two functions–the collection plan and the vulnerability assessments–were conducted 
independently of each other and by different personnel.  Neither of these groups was 
involved in the active support of operations. 
The personnel involved in managing ACTIC recognized that operations were 
disjointed and of little use to field personnel involved in emergency response.  A solution 
evolved that consists of several components: 
• The Terrorism Officers became Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLOs) who 
can be drawn from only specific backgrounds:  police, fire or military.  
Additionally, they are required to possess a security clearance. 
• TLOs originate from the operational ranks of a multitude of agencies and 
jurisdictions and therefore deliver a wide range of capabilities and 
resources.  They are “loaned” to ACTIC by their respective agencies for 
10 hours per week and are on call within their jurisdictions at other times.  
They also possess the ability to respond to jurisdictions outside of their 
own. 
• TLOs are provided with fully equipped Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, or High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) vehicles that 
enable them to participate actively in operations support.  The equipment 
they carry includes a laptop computer with wireless internet capability, a 
printer, a digital camera, a camcorder, a Global Positioning System (GPS), 
binoculars, and a spotting scope. 
• Operations support consists of direct assistance to various agencies in the 
field at the scene of an incident as it develops.  The TLOs possess “reach 
back” capability that allows them to access information through ACTIC 
that would otherwise not be available.  The assignment of a TLO to 
various response functions – such as police, fire, and emergency 
operations – permits an on-scene yet “behind the scenes” communication 
capability between different agencies.  Furthermore, the unique knowledge 
of the TLOs, and the contacts that they have developed, permit easier 
inter-agency cooperation. 
• The TLOs are in close physical and functional daily contact with criminal 
and intelligence personnel with whom they are co-located at ACTIC. 
• The TLOs maintain the collection plan and actively perform vulnerability 
assessments and building intelligence collection.  Corroboration between 
TLOs from different agencies through mutual assistance in performing 
vulnerability assessments permits a diverse perspective and therefore the 
likelihood of a more comprehensive final product.  Similarly, in 
performing “distant” vulnerability assessments the TLOs become familiar 
with a wide range of target hazards throughout the state. 
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• The TLOs provide “added value” to their home agencies by sharing 
(“reporting back”) information and intelligence that is garnered during 
their time at the ACTIC.  Such cross pollination acts as a catalyst in the 
dissemination of useful information, and the spreading of techniques and 
practices. 
• The involvement of the TLOs with the long-term cultivation of 
information, the performance of vulnerability assessments, collaboration 
with other agencies including intelligence and criminal entities, and active 
support of operations results in a comprehensive capability to enhance 
information management within the ACTIC. 
A real life example of the manner in which the TLO can effectively function in 
support of operations occurred on February 23, 2006.  A hostage situation developed on 
an upper floor of a high rise building in Phoenix, Arizona.  TLOs responded immediately 
and remotely retrieved and provided the Phoenix Police Department Swat team with 
color photographs of the suspect.  Command staff were concurrently provided with a 
criminal and mental health history of the suspect, and fire and EMS personnel were 
provided with color photographs of each of the nine hostages.  The presence of several 
TLOs and their interoperability permitted fire department and EMS personnel to be 
staged two floors below the incident to permit rapid response in the event of a sudden 
emergency.  After nearly 7 hours of negotiation the suspect surrendered peacefully and 
was taken into custody without any injuries.106 
 
A. LESSONS FROM ACTIC 
 
Several positive lessons may be extracted from the above analysis of the working 
mechanism of ACTIC: 
• The importance of selecting personnel based upon qualifications and 
experience 
• The importance of a consistent terrorism prevention and response 
methodology within the department 
• The importance of the various and diverse components within the 
department collaborating in preparation for response 
 
                                                 
106 Rick Salyers and Troy Lutrick, “Best Defense: Arizona’s Terrorism Liaison Officers Program 
Allows the Fire Service to Take a Proactive Role in Intelligence Gathering and Sharing,” Fire Chief, 
February 2007, 48 – 53. 
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• The importance of maintaining a close relationship between personnel 
within the Fire Department who are dedicated to terrorism and operations-
level personnel within the fire department who do not possess terrorism as 
a primary mission 
• The importance of intra-departmental relationships between personnel 
with counter-terrorism missions; i.e., intelligence personnel in the fire 
department speaking on a regular basis with intelligence personnel within 
the police department, and cooperating in joint projects such as 
vulnerability assessments 
• The need for a collaborative process, involving fire department personnel, 
to develop intelligence specific to fire operations using analysts dedicated 
to this activity 
• The need for a capability to provide support to operations through 
interconnectivity and “reach-back” mechanisms, and the use of technology 
to accomplish reach-back and information sharing with commanders on-
scene.  This capability may be contrasted with the inability of Detective 
Wallace to convey critical structural information to commanders at the 
World Trade Center on 9-11 (refer to Chapter IX) 
Many of these lessons and considerations may prove important for the FDNY in 
the contemplation of methods to better manage information. 
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XI. TIER 7:  THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT  
Perhaps the most illustrative and comprehensive example of the development of 
an information management system in response to the terrorist threat is that of the post-
9/11 New York City Police Department (NYPD).  Commissioner Raymond Kelly has 
taken dramatic and targeted steps to improve the capabilities of his agency to handle 
intelligence related information.  The following information was obtained largely from 
information provided by New York City Police Officer/Field Intelligence Officer Daniel 
Kirwin.107 
Prior to 9/11 the intelligence component of the NYPD consisted of a singular 
counterterrorism module that operated out of One Police Plaza (police headquarters) and 
provided “coverage” of the entire city.  Following the attacks, the need for change was 
recognized and acted upon.  Changes took place at several levels. First, the singular 
counterterrorism module was enlarged and expanded.  Recognition of the need to 
perform more systemic information control and dissemination within the department 
resulted in the establishment of additional similarly structured counterterrorism modules 
collocated in a precinct in each of the five boroughs of New York City. Due to 
complexity and size Queens, Manhattan and Brooklyn were provided with two such 
modules (north and south).  Furthermore, modules were established within the Transit 
and Housing Divisions of the NYPD.  Thus the total number of modules was increased 
from one to twelve, with the number of personnel assigned to each of these modules 
established at approximately three to four.  The counterterrorism modules are staffed by 
uniformed police personnel chosen based upon aptitude, capabilities, and experience 
related to the recognition of value within large quantities of diverse information.  The 
primary function of these officers is to collect and sift through terrorist related 
information (obtained from a wide variety of sources including open source, law 
enforcement periodicals, intelligence related information sharing networks, and hot line 
derived “leads”), identify that which is of particular relevance to their particular borough, 
extract this “added value” information while recognizing patterns, synergies and 
                                                 
107 P.O. Daniel Kirwin, NYPD Counter-Terrorism, interviewed by author, Queens, N.Y., December 
19, 2006.  
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commonalities that may exist, combine and condense the information so obtained, and 
fashion the information into a practical and deliverable form for a variety of “users” 
within the borough.  Primary among these users is the Borough Commander, who is 
briefed on a daily basis regarding that which has been determined to be particularly 
important to the interests of the borough and its citizens.  The Borough Commander in 
turn discusses this information with the precinct commanders within his purview; with 
Field Intelligence Officers (described below); with his immediate superior (Patrol 
Commander); and with the balance of Borough Commanders at weekly meetings and 
through conference calls.  Other users within the Borough police structure who receive 
selected information from the counter-terrorism module include individual precinct Field 
Intelligence Officers (described below), precinct and borough training officers, and 
operational units who may be required to take careful and deliberate, or swift and 
decisive, action based upon the nature of the information received.  The counter-terrorism 
module also provides information that dictates the activity and staffing level of the 
“Atlas” team.  This team is comprised of a supervisor and police officers who are 
assigned to counter terrorism duties and are given a list of high priority locations (such as 
bridges and tunnels) and specialty events (such as parades) for the purposes of special 
attention, deterrence and rapid interdiction.  These individuals are kept informed of 
terrorist related developments on a real-time basis.  The counter-terrorism module also 
serves as a liaison with other city agencies, develops specific training programs, and 
serves as a conduit for information received from other intelligence-related NYPD 
functionaries.  These functionaries include a new domestic and international terrorism 
research center (described below) and a program whereby NYPD operatives maintain a 
presence in several foreign countries for the purpose of obtaining first-hand terrorism 
related information tied to actual events.  Information so derived is disseminated to the 
precincts through the counter-terrorism modules.  These dedicated counter-terrorism 
modules are therefore a critical component in affecting the collection, analyzing, 
dissemination and actionable implementation of intelligence and information.  A security 
clearance is required to perform these functions. 
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A second and completely new enhancement to the NYPD following 9/11 is the 
establishment of a diffuse intelligence management capability.  This system revolves 
around a position known as the Field Intelligence Officer (FIO).  There is one such 
individual in each of the 76 precincts throughout the city.  The FIO is tasked primarily 
with the localized collection of important information.  As he serves the needs of the 
Precinct Commander, this individual is concerned with both criminal and terrorist 
activity.  In short, his or her role is to “find it out, write it down, and get it out” to the 
hierarchy and to the intelligence operatives (including the counter-terrorism modules) for 
widespread, or targeted, distribution within the department.  He also acts as a conduit for 
information that is received from other counter terrorism functionaries and provides this 
information directly to precinct level personnel (including patrol officers).  The 
individual chosen for this position is a capable supervisor who is familiar with the 
“personality” and inner workings of the precinct.  He is therefore likely to experience a 
sense of responsibility and affinity for those within his domain. The FIO therefore 
provides a consequential and pivotal role: intimate precinct knowledge and an 
appreciation for, and contacts within, the larger NYPD intelligence community. 
Two additional and illustrative examples of pro-activity on the part of the NYPD 
include the following: 
• The establishment of a counter-terror training center wherein detailed 
replicas of actual terrorist facilities and bomb factories are constructed for 
the purpose of training NYPD patrol officers.  Mock-ups include the van 
used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the apartment within 
which the bombs used in the 2005 London transit attacks were fabricated, 
and the apartment/ bomb factory of a potential suicide bomber who 
detonated a device in Oklahoma in 2005.  These models are replete with 
actual chemicals and bomb ingredients intended to enhance police officer 
recognition and identification skills.108 
• The detailed investigation of significant terrorist events, including those 
occurring in foreign countries, by highly trained NYPD personnel 
dedicated to this effort.109  The end result is the development of 
informational presentations provided to NYPD personnel ranging from the 
Police Commissioner to newly appointed patrol officers by way of the 
mechanisms described above.  These presentations have also been 
                                                 
108 Alison Gendar, “Windows on Terror: Cops Learn How to Spot Bomb Labs,” New York Daily 
News, May 7, 2006, 14. 
109 Erika Martinez, “NYPD’s Global Eyes and Ears,” New York Post, November 28, 2005, 3.  
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disseminated among various elements of the national homeland security 
community and have been observed as possessing more value than similar 
efforts on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).110 
The operations-level personnel who comprise the Counter Terrorism and 
Intelligence divisions together form a network of intelligence and information 
management that serves the needs of the department and the citizenry.  These internally 
directed efforts of the NYPD in response to the new terrorist threat are observed to be 
comprehensive, actuated by competent personnel, organized toward effectiveness, and 
largely in conformance with the widely recommended post-9/11 strategies of information 
sharing. 
No system is perfect, however, and although many positive lessons may be 
learned from the above analysis several shortfalls may be identified with the NYPD 
system of information management: 
• The system does not account or allow for the formal participation of those 
within homeland security who do not serve a law enforcement mission 
(i.e., the FDNY).  The continued existence of significant organizational 
bias between the NYPD and the FDNY, markedly visible in response 
activity (as described by Chief Joseph Pfeifer111), can be reasonably 
assumed to also exist in the information-sharing realm.  There is no reason 
to believe that cooperation will be natural or expected in the absence of a 
formal structure for information sharing.  
• Paralleling the experience of the FDNY as primarily a firefighting 
organization, the primary mission of the operational component of the 
NYPD is not intelligence or terrorism.  Rather, it is crime. Many of those 
involved with intelligence, including the FIO, also possess responsibility 
deriving from the more visible day-to-day criminal aspects of the NYPD.  
The performance of those they report to – such as the Precinct 
Commander - is largely determined by crime related indicators of success.  
A strong compulsion to act in response to the ever-present criminal 
concern, versus the rarely visible terrorist threat, is likely to distract the 
efforts of those with a joint mission.  A dedicated effort for counter-
terrorism is likely to produce better results.  
 
 
                                                 
110 Deputy Chief John Ball, Indianapolis Metro. Police Department and Director of Indianapolis and 
Marin County Emergency Services, telephone interview by the author, February 6, 2007. 
111 Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World Trade 
Center,” in Psychology of Terror. 
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A. LESSONS FROM THE NYPD INITIATIVES 
 
The management of information has been recognized as a critical need by the 
NYPD and has been dealt with in a serious and organized manner.  This in and of itself 
serves as a fundamental lesson to the FDNY.  Other, more specific, lessons are available 
as follows: 
• The selection of personnel based upon recognized capabilities and 
qualifications 
• The ability to manage information in a manner that allows it to be 
supportive of both the general knowledge level of police officers and 
specialized operational forces in the field (i.e., the Atlas Teams) 
• A system of obtaining information from a wide variety of sources and 
performing in-house analysis and dissemination 
• The ability to process intelligence from the available information 
• A widespread and highly visible informational presence throughout the 
department and at all levels within the department 
• A capability to directly support, and benefit from, those personnel who 
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XII. TIER 8:  THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
COMMUNITY 
Contrary to the experience of the fire community, advancements have been made 
by the law enforcement community who by nature of the nexus between terrorism and 
crime are a step closer than firefighters to the terrorist threat in the hierarchy of 
emergency response.  Lessons may be learned by firefighters from the observation of 
post-9/11 advancements on the part of local law enforcement entities, and perhaps many 
of these lessons may be applied to the firefighting community to increase its efficacy.  
Advances by the law enforcement community have been seen in the form of several 
initiatives: 
• The planned adaptation of Problem Oriented Policing (POP), Community 
Oriented Policing (COP) and Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) as enhanced 
methodologies for dealing with both crime and terrorism 
• Since 2003, the concept of “fusion centers” has advanced so as to 
encompass an increasing number of states and regions.  These centers 
have been established to support information sharing primarily between 
police agencies, with several centers including participants from a variety 
of entities in the community 
• Law enforcement agencies and professional organizations have invested 
considerable effort into establishing protocols, resources, websites, 
training programs, and horizontal information sharing mechanisms that 
serve the needs of the law enforcement community relative to terrorism 
prevention.  These entities include the Department of Justice Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and 
the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
• The development and implementation of information-sharing systems 
available to the police officer on the street, capable of providing timely 
access to computerized databases containing such stored information as 
criminal identities and stolen vehicles 
• The development of information sharing networks designed to continually 
convey vital intelligence and information to a large number of law 
enforcement entities.  These dissemination systems include Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO), Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), 
and many others 
The fire community as a whole has not experienced a similar enhancement of 
education and information sharing mechanisms.  Since 9-11 firefighters are generally 
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more aware of the terrorist threat and its potential consequences, based upon their simple 
observation and realization of the potential catastrophic effects of attack.  However, 
firefighters do not routinely participate in most fusion centers and do not possess a formal 
methodology for collecting, reporting, analyzing, sharing, receiving and disseminating 
intelligence (as previously indicated, the participation of firefighters in the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force in New York City is limited to two non-responders without a direct 
tie to the “field”).  There is no national or regional mechanism for the collaboration of 
firefighters with other participants in national security, nor is there a national or regional 
capability for sharing with other firefighters.  Participation of firefighters in federally 
funded programs within the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium112 has 
increased substantially; however, only a small portion of this training is related to 
prevention-related or intelligence/information sharing subject matter.  There are no 
formalized professionally based programs available to firefighters for the enhancement of 
these capabilities.   Contrary to the experience of the law enforcement community, the 
firefighting agencies and professional organizations have failed to provide for the 
development and support of mechanisms that enhance capabilities to utilize and share 
information and intelligence on a local, regional or national level. 
A significant and largely unrecognized factor in the failure of the FDNY to 
mature in an intelligence capacity is the reality that firefighters, during the normal 
conduct of their duties, are capable of innocuously entering locations wherein covert 
terrorist activity may be taking place.  As stated by the State of Illinois Governor’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Public Safety and Homeland Security:  “when police officers 
enter an occupancy bad guys run out the back door.  When firefighters enter an 
occupancy people continue business-as-usual.”113  The advantage of this capability is 
enhanced by case law that is supportive of the “plain view doctrine.”114  If government 
                                                 
112 Five training partners comprise this consortium:  The Center for Domestic Preparedness ; New 
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; Louisiana State University; Texas A&M; and the Department 
of Energy’s Nevada Test Site. Information available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm, 
last accessed on January 28, 2007. 
113 Colonel (Retired) Jill Morgenthaler, Illinois Governor’s Chief of Staff for Public Safety and 
Homeland Security, presentation to student body (Cohorts 0503/0504), Naval Postgraduate School CHDS 
Master’s Degree Program, January 10, 2007. 
114 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983). 
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officials are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating 
character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the 
object, they may seize it without a warrant.  Opportunities arise from such fire 
department activities as building inspection, complaint enforcement and response.  
Within the City of New York in 2005 firefighting companies performed 68,595 building 
inspections.115  The department engaged in 1,129,842 Emergency Medical Services 
incidents, the vast majority of them indoors.116  These all represent opportunities to 
casually observe and report nefarious behavior.  Regular access is thereby obtained to 
locations that are not routinely accessed by the law enforcement community under non-
emergency conditions, a distinct advantage for the identification and collection of 
information.  This advantage is only possible if firefighters are conscious of the need to 
observe and are trained to identify and collect this information.  Such training and 
awareness has not been part-and-parcel with either the firefighter’s continual training or 
his of her daily activities.  An initial 8 hour training class on WMD has been provided to 
field level firefighters and is provided to all FDNY recruit classes.117  This class provides 
information on general recognition and identification; no additional “refresher” training is 
provided to field units following the initial class, and no formal mechanism for 
maintaining terrorism awareness or for systematized information dissemination exists.   
There is a further advantage that accrues to the fire service in the observance and 
reporting of information in both public and private venues.  Firefighters are not 
constrained by the challenges faced within the law enforcement community regarding the 
constitutionally derived rights of U.S. citizens specific to illegal search and seizure.  Alert 
firefighters, capable of recognizing indicators of terrorist activity and in the course of 
normal business activity, do not require probable cause.  These firefighters enter 
occupancies on a regular and frequent basis.  For example, during a medical related 
response to an apartment firefighters may observe indicators of terrorism, such as bomb-
making chemicals or detonators, and report them to either the law enforcement or 
intelligence communities.  Firefighters therefore possess a significant capability not 
                                                 
115 FDNY Annual Report Fiscal 2005, 13. 
116 Ibid., 11. 
117 Emergency Response to Terrorism: Operations – Student Manual, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C.; September 2001.  
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commonly available to law enforcement personnel.  Entry into an occupancy for fire or 
emergency purposes may therefore be incidentally, but immediately, productive for 
prevention and interdiction purposes.   
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XIII. TIER 9:  INTELLIGENCE AS INFORMATION 
A. INTELLIGENCE 
 
Many of the systemic shortfalls in the FDNY regarding the use of information 
have been identified.  A new and special category of information that has been discussed 
within this report possesses special relevance to the firefighter.  This type of information 
is known as “intelligence” in defense and law enforcement communities.  The 
consideration of intelligence for firefighters was largely non-existent prior to 9-11.  The 
loss of 343 personnel as a direct result of gaps in intelligence (identified in the 9-11 
Commission Report) indicates a serious need for the FDNY to embrace the concept at this 
time.  Despite the unprecedented toll on the department due to 9-11, a survey question 
asking respondents to identify the five commonly cited elements of the intelligence cycle 
revealed that less than 2% were capable of doing so (survey question 13).  A suitable and 
workable definition of intelligence as it pertains to firefighting is therefore considered 
important prior to embarking on a search for solutions to information needs.   
Definitions of the term “intelligence” in literature are abundant, each framed by 
the perspective, needs, characteristics and intentions of the definer.  Intelligence as a 
concept first developed in response to the secretive needs of developing nation states, 
such as England during the reign of Elizabeth I.118  The “global” nature of intelligence in 
its formative and developmental years resulted in a preponderance of definitions which 
revolve around nation-centric interpretations of the term.  As a result, most definitions of 
intelligence have come to represent a concept supportive of national defense related 
issues.  The result has been a preponderance of descriptions such as: 
The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information 
concerning foreign countries or areas.119 
                                                 
118 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006),12. 
119 This definition, cited in “Toward a Theory of Intelligence, Workshop Report,” Gregory Treverton, 
et al., RAND Corporation, 2006, is derived from Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (as amended through 9 May 2005), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, last accessed on November 15, 2006. 
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Other definitions revolve around the secretive nature of intelligence, resulting 
from the competitive nature of the concept observed in foreign affairs: 
The secret collection of someone else’s secrets.120 
The more recent development of threats within the borders of the nation has 
resulted in still more varied definitions of the term, more closely specific to the law 
enforcement community.  For instance: 
Intelligence, therefore, is a synergistic product intended to provide 
meaningful and trustworthy direction to law enforcement decision makers 
about complex criminality, criminal enterprises, criminal extremists, and 
terrorists.121 
It may be observed that intelligence as a concept has been defined many times 
over by many different entities in response to developing needs over time.  It is therefore 
difficult for the fire service to “adopt” a definition.  Furthermore, most intelligence is 
developed and implemented in ways that are completely foreign to the fire service 
environment.  Terms such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and 
Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),122 and activities such 
as espionage and propaganda, for instance, are associated with the most commonly 
understood definitions of intelligence but are useless in considering the needs of first 
responders.  The novelty of intelligence to the fire community and the need for the FDNY 
to internalize an awareness of the new radical terrorist threat create the need for a loose 
definition that is both solvent and practical.  Prior to such a definition important 
boundaries should be established: 
• Because the fire service is primarily a consumer of intelligence, the term 
“intelligence” will be used to indicate a commodity that is processed from 
information by others and provided to firefighters, either directly or 
indirectly, by those who are considered intelligence professionals; i.e., 
agents and analysts working outside of the traditional role of the fire 
service. 
                                                 
120 This definition, cited in “Toward a Theory of Intelligence, Workshop Report,” Gregory Treverton, 
et al., RAND Corporation, 2006, is attributable to K.G. Robertson in his article, “Intelligence, Terrorism 
and Civil Liberties,” Conflict Quarterly VII, no. 2: 43-62. 
121 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Enforcement 
Agencies, November 2004, 7. 
122 These are acronyms for human intelligence, measurement and signals intelligence, and signals 
intelligence, examples of commonly employed collection techniques. 
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• Intelligence shall refer to the end-product of a process conducted by 
analysts.  It is a tangible entity designed to be utilized, as opposed to the 
process whereby it is derived, or the sources from which it originates. 
• Despite an absence of history in this pursuit, the fire community is not 
incapable of developing its own intelligence.  In order to differentiate 
intelligence formulated by the fire service from that provided by others, 
the specific term “fire intelligence,” as opposed to “intelligence,” will be 
used to identify, and distinguish, the product of the processing of 
information that is performed by and within the fire community. 
In conformance with these characteristics the following definition of intelligence 
is proposed: 
Meaningful and trustworthy information that is provided to firefighting 
forces by intelligence professionals, in order to provide warning, and to 
improve the safety and efficacy of response, in support of the homeland 
security mission. 
Similarly, “fire intelligence” shall be defined as follows: 
Iinformation derived by the fire service for the fire service, and for the 
utilization of others, intended to provide meaningful and trustworthy 
direction and support to decision makers in pursuit of the homeland 
security mission. 
Three distinct new terms have therefore been isolated:  information, intelligence, 
and fire intelligence.  In an ideal world intelligence originates outside of the department 
and is provided by others who determine the department’s “need to know.”  An example 
would be a developing threat that is communicated to the FDNY by the NYPD, such as 
the discovery of information that a terrorist group will target the subway system on a 
specific date.  Information, on the other hand, is actively collected by the department.  It 
exists both within the department and outside of the department: for instance, the location 
of sprinklers in a target hazard building is known by the FDNY and the location of exits 
is known by the Department of Buildings.  This information is not co-located, however, 
and must be actively collected and consolidated.  The current system of information 
support, described and illustrated above, does not provide for such activity.  Both 
intelligence and information can be important in the preparation for, and response to, a 
terrorist incident.  Collectively they can form the basis for the development of fire 
intelligence, a derivative of careful selection and processing by people designated to this 
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task. Under normal day-to-day circumstances of response fire intelligence is not a 
consideration; however, when it becomes a consideration it is likely to be immensely 




This chapter focused on the related concepts of information and intelligence as 
they have been traditionally recognized.  It also expanded the concept of information to 
include new considerations important to firefighters.  In this regard three terms were 
newly defined - information, intelligence, and fire intelligence.  Other jurisdictions and 
firefighting entities may wish to adopt these fundamental terms as they confront future 
challenges related to terrorism. 
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XIV. BEYOND THE OBVIOUS:  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATUS QUO 
This paper has investigated the organizational characteristics of information 
management within the FDNY as it prepares for terrorist events.  The direct impact of 
information on operational capabilities and effectiveness are readily apparent.  Less 
visible, however, are the potential implications of existing information-sharing 
methodologies on the psychological preparedness of the individual responder and the 
agency as a whole.   
Responders are people and are therefore subject to the same vulnerabilities that 
characterize any individual exposed to trauma.  “The protective services professionals … 
who respond to the needs of a community as a result of acts of terrorism are not immune 
from these consequences.”123  The potential degree of exposure of any first responder to 
the manifestations of terrorism can range from complete immersion in the event as it 
unfolds–essentially causing the responder to become a direct physical and emotional 
victim, regardless of his level of “success” in performance–to the full range of 
experiences realized by the general population through such mechanisms as reliving the 
event visa-vi media coverage.  The “psychology of terrorism” is a relatively new and 
explorative area of expertise that intends to improve awareness of the implications of 
terrorism for the human psyche.  The youthfulness of this endeavor does not preclude the 
use of related research that supports other disciplines, or the exploitation of the terrorist-
specific knowledge that has accumulated in the recent past, in the support of better 
policies. 
Ideally, any FDNY strategy should incorporate elements that seek to improve the 
emotional and mental health of those who implement it.  At the very least, strategy 
should strive to “do no harm.”  In this light two considerations warrant exploration: the 
impact of strategy that is perceived as poorly supporting responder needs, and the 
benefits of a considerate and informed strategy on operational forces. 
 
                                                 
123 D.Paton and J. Violanti, Psychology of Terrorism, 225. 
108 
Where does one start in the pursuit of these considerations?  The survey of FDNY 
responders has clearly identified concerns regarding the manner in which the adequacy of 
informational support is perceived by firefighters.  What are the likely implications of 




Terrorism has been identified as “the ‘perfect’ traumatic stressor, because it 
defines the elements of malevolent intent, actual or threatened extreme harm, and 
unending fear of the future”124 (emphasis provided).  The negative emotional aspects 
associated with the anticipation of a future attack–particularly anxiety and, to some 
degree, a feeling of helplessness–are fueled by inadequate knowledge and information 
regarding terrorists, their methods, motives, and agents.   
Fear is usually a transient, adaptive response … anxiety represents a 
longer-term response to impending danger, which may range from a well 
defined circumstance to situations that are very vague.  Anxiety is marked 
by apprehension, vigilance, negative thoughts and feelings (e.g. worry), 
motor tension, and physiological arousal.  …fear and anxiety help us cope 
in the short run, but when they persist, they can have serious negative 
consequences for general health and mental functioning.125   
Aside from the direct effects described above, pre-incident anxiety may 
exacerbate other underlying issues related to mental health, increase the potential for 
post-incident distress, and may cause distraction, and under-emphasis or over-emphasis 
on particular aspects of a potential threat that, in the presence of better information, 
would be more accurately predicted.  More and better information will reduce the 
potential for “guessing” what may happen and will provide the individual who anticipates 
response with a clearer picture of what he may “truly expect,” resulting in a less worried, 
more confident, and better focused responder. 
  
                                                 
124 L. Miller, “Psychological Interventions for Terroristic Trauma: Symptoms, Syndromes, and 
Treatment Strategies,” Psychotherapy: Theory/ Research/Practice/Training, 2002, 296. 
125 Rachel Yahuda and Steven Hyman, “The Impact of Terrorism on Brain, and Behavior: What We 
Know and What We Need to Know,” Neuropsychopharmacology 30 (2005): 1773-1780. 
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B. DURING RESPONSE 
 
The degree of shock or surprise experienced by a responder at a terrorist incident 
is likely to be greater than that experienced during his or her normal or “routine” 
response activity.  To the firefighter inordinate stress is considered normal, and expected 
levels of stress actually represent an opportunity to more fully appreciate the joys of life 
by knowing and understanding human tragedy.126  The pre-incident expectations held by 
a responder relative to the fulfillment, or deconstruction, of those realizations at an 
incident has been shown to directly impact his or her level of distress during an event.   
The degree of fit between (responders) expectations and what they 
encounter is a significant indicator of stress risk.”127 and “It is important 
to recognize that expectations and perceptions mediate the impact of many 
stressors and that an event has a stressful impact to the extent that it is 
appraised as taxing or exceeding one’s resources…128    
Stress among responders is therefore increased by an absence of accurate 
knowledge regarding likely outcomes.  What are the ramifications of inordinately 
excessive stress at an incident scene?  Studies have shown that emotional distress is 
sufficient to impair the performance of even the most highly trained people, and that too 
much stress reduces the accuracy of vigilance tasks.  Effects include maladaptive 
behavior including insensitivity or oversensitivity to clues and defensive avoidance, and a 
reduction in the ability to develop creative solutions.129  The variable nature of individual 
responses to stress can result in such effects contributing to confusion and chaos.  These 
effects have been proposed as being part of the very strategy of asymmetric terrorism.130  
Additionally, stress can cause disharmony and fracturing of emergency response 
                                                 
126 S.J. Woodall, “Hearts on Fire: An Exploration of the Emotional World of Firefighters,” Clinical 
Sociology Review 15 (1997): 155. 
127 Douglas Paton, “Disaster Relief Work: An Assessment of Training Effectiveness,” Journal of 
Traumatic Stress (1994): 275-288. 
128 Susan Brandon and Andrew Silke, “Near- and Long- Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to 
Terrorist Attacks,” Chapter 13 in Psychology of Terrorism (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 178. 
129 Douglas Paton and R. Flin, “Disaster Stress: An Emergency Management Perspective”, Disaster 
Prevention and Management 8 (1999): 261-267. 
130 Denis Embry, “Psychological Weapons of Mass Disruption through Vicarious Classical 
Conditioning,” Chapter 12 in Psychology of Terrorism (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
170. 
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operations, a factor magnified by the reliance firefighters place upon teamwork.  A 
firefighter may experience debilitating levels of stress at a challenging incident while 
others under the same circumstances remain relatively unaffected.  The impact of stress 
has been shown to have deleterious effects on the efficacy of rescue efforts at past 
incidents.  As determined by the McKinsey investigation and subsequent report, many of 
the firefighters responding to 9-11 broke ranks, disobeyed orders, and acted impulsively, 
rushing up the towers in a way that has been likened to “Pickett’s charge” of futility.131   
Lastly, studies have shown that active coping (e.g., taking action to improve the 
situation) is inversely associated with distress and general anxiety.132  The inclination to 
take positive action, and the effectiveness of that action, will inarguably be enhanced by 
improved systems of information management and recognized institutional support.  The 
absence of these mechanisms will tend to encourage the opposite effect; that is, the 




Although “firefighters are human too,” a lesser incidence of post-incident distress 
is likely to occur within first responders than among the civilian population.  A portion of 
this phenomena is likely attributable to career self-selection.133  It is reasonable to 
conclude, however, that some degree of protection is afforded by a mindset of 
preparedness, the perception of adequate support, and good information sources.  Greater 
levels of stress during an incident have been consistently and positively correlated with 
an increased potential for post-incident indicators of mental instability such as ASD 
(Anxiety Stress Disorder) and PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).  This determinant 
- the level of stress experienced during response – has been shown to be inversely related 
to a crucial competence of responders, a competence known as “situational awareness.”  
This has been defined as “the ability to extract salient clues that assist in adapting plans                                                  
131 A.J.W. Taylor, “Defusing the Terrorism of Terror,” Chapter 24 in Psychology of Terrorism (New 
York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2007), 384. 
132 Josef Rusek, et al., “Evidence-Based Interventions for Survivors of Terrorism,” Chapter 18 in 
Psychology of Terrorism (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2007), 260. 
133 Lisa Butler, et al., Psychology of Terrorism, 407. 
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and response actions to fit unpredictable situational demands.”134  The stress reduction 
cycle is therefore presented as follows:  Information (both pre-incident and that 
developed on-scene) enhances situational awareness.  Situational awareness reduces the 
level of the “unknown,” and therefore the level of stress that is experienced.  This 
reduction translates into a reduced potential for post-incident psychosomatic distress.  
Conversely, a “feedback loop” can develop in an absence of information under extreme 
stress.  Incomplete or absent information decreases the level of situational awareness.  
Poor situational awareness increases stress and decreases the capacity of an individual or 
organization to collect and share information, further reducing situational awareness, 
further increasing stress, etc…, perpetuating a downward spiral at a time when every 
advantage is critical.  Both sides of this phenomenon are illustrated in the divergent 
experiences of the FDNY and the NYPD as reported by the initial incident commander at 
the World Trade Center on 9-11.135  The NYPD possesses better support in the form of 
knowledge relative to the collapse potential of the buildings.  Evacuation was consistent 
and the relative losses were low (23 fatalities in a force of over 35,000).  Many within the 
ranks of fire responders remained ignorant of the inherent dangers and evacuation was 
variable.  Units stationed two blocks away suffered no losses while units from 10 miles 
away suffered losses measured in the tens of firefighters. 
In summary, the recognition of the short- and long- term implications of an 
absence of information on operating personnel must be realized.  Improvements for 
obtaining and sharing information are justified from this perspective alone.  The mere 
perception of support by firefighters is likely to provide benefits to both the individual 
and the department.  The absence of this perception may prove costly on a variety of 
levels. 
                                                 
134 D. Paton and J. Violanti, Psychology of Terrorism, 231. 
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XV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information in written form that is directly related to the participation of the 
firefighting community in terrorism prevention and mitigation is relatively scant.  The 
perceived distance between these two once-distant worlds – firefighting and terrorism - 
has resulted in an absence of concentration on the subject and a subsequent dearth of 
directly reflective literature.  Furthermore, the firefighting community has proven 
reluctant or unable to record any instances of experience in this regard.  Simply put: the 
profession of firefighting does not have a strong history of recording information that is 
tangential to its past priorities of extinguishing fire and performing rescue.  New York 
City is no exception:  literature specific to terrorism-related information and intelligence 
sharing within and by the FDNY is virtually non-existent.  Research indicates that a 
significant amount of literature has evolved concerning parallel and related subject matter 
as found in other professions. The investigation of these recorded sources will assist an 
intuitive understanding of the challenges, limits, and potential benefits and drawbacks of 
more fully integrating firefighters into the intelligence community.  It is observed that the 
firefighting community is most closely allied with the local law enforcement community 
in this regard.  It is further observed that the abundance of literature in that community 
related to terrorism and information sharing concerns that brand of information defined as 
“intelligence.”  Many of the recorded initiatives that pertain to law enforcement and 
intelligence may therefore be investigated for applicability to firefighters. 
In Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Mark Lowenthal defines the intelligence 
cycle and each of its interrelated parts.136  The book provides fundamental information 
concerning intelligence as a concept; as a policy; its historical development within the 
United States and elsewhere; its relationship with the policy maker; recent challenges to 
the intelligence community; and moral and ethical considerations.  These topics 
contribute to a foundation of understanding regarding the global and national intelligence 
community, portions of which may be extrapolated and molded to form a basis for 
constructing intelligence systems at the local level.  Importantly, Lowenthal indicates that 
there are many forms of intelligence that support a variety of needs.  He also                                                  
136 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006). 
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differentiates between “intelligence” and “information,” a distinction that provides some 
insight into the limitations of the extent to which the fire community may participate in 
true intelligence versus the more achievable role of managing information. His chapter 
concerning “collection” broadens the understanding of the multiple methods available for 
gaining such information.  The content and construct of the book, however, are defined 
by the context of the author’ background – he being an intelligence official in the 
executive and legislative branches of government for over 30 years.  The limits of the 
book are themselves indicative of the problem at hand: that is, it essentially ignores the 
direct role that may be played by local responders in a national intelligence structure.  
The author’s perspective is almost exclusively nation-centric, with little direct 
information concerning the environment at the local level.  Lowenthal contributes little to 
the understanding of how domestic and foreign intelligence may be merged, managed 
and controlled locally.  He also neglects to provide information concerning the 
involvement of those outside of law enforcement in intelligence.  In the final analysis 
“Intelligence” contributes to a general understanding of intelligence as a concept and an 
appreciation for the history and status of the national intelligence community.  The 
emphasis on national and global intelligence reinforces the concept that to-date local 
activity has not been considered as contributory to the needs of the intelligence 
community.  Importantly, the concept of the intelligence cycle is explored, a concept with 
applicability to the local response community. 
“The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence”137 is similarly focused on national 
intelligence concerns.  While emphasizing the effects of intelligence on U.S. foreign 
policy, the authors provide insight that may be directly applied to locally gathered and 
disseminated intelligence systems.  After identifying a number of reasons why the 
“United States slept”138 prior to 9-11, they cite changes that need to be made for a more 
secure future.  These include the strengthening of “all-source intelligence;” the need to 
recognize that “traditional notions of intelligence may need to be expanded to 
accommodate new tactics and requirements;” and “expanding the conceptions of the 
                                                 
137 Frank Cilluffo, Ronald Marks and George Salmoiraghi, “The Use and Limits of US Intelligence,”  
Strategic Intelligence, edited by Loch Johnson and James Wirtz (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 2004), 
33-39. 
138 Ibid., 33. 
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strengths and limitations of various agencies that have not historically been part of the 
core activities of the [Intelligence Community].”  Once again, these activities appear to 
be primarily aimed at federal agencies and assets; however, because of similarities in the 
ultimate objective of increasing awareness through information, they provide some 
justification for similar mechanisms at the local level.  More directly to the point of 
incorporating local involvement, the authors cite the need to strengthen the methods and 
technology to share information with individuals who do not have clearances, and for 
officials to “develop a method whereby information flows up from the local levels to the 
federal level.”139  
The recognition by the federal government of the need to expand capabilities 
regarding the collection, sharing and dissemination of information has been identified in 
the publication of numerous documents within the climate of reform that developed in the 
aftermath of 9-11.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security represents a strategy 
aimed at mobilizing and organizing the entire nation against terrorist attacks.140  Three 
areas of the document, in particular, relate to intelligence and information systems.  The 
critical mission area defined as “Intelligence and Warning” describes the need for a 
intelligence and warning system that is capable of detecting terrorist activity prior to an 
attack, and supports this description with a past example of failure (Pearl Harbor).  It then 
describes the analysis functions required by current threats, the actions which may be 
taken following analysis, and enhancements in existing systems that represent major 
improvement initiatives.  It is of note that the analysis, activity, and enhancement 
recommendations pertain exclusively to federal entities such as the FBI and the Office of 
Homeland Security, and remain silent on recommendations for the enhancement of local 
entities.  A chart depicting the roles and responsibilities of Homeland Security 
Intelligence and Information Analysis fails to identify any local participants.  A second 
area of the document, “Information Sharing and Systems,” pertains to the technological 
means of sharing information across governmental lines, both horizontally and vertically. 
It establishes the need for the institution of such sharing systems but does not provide 
                                                 
139 Cilluffo and Salmoiraghi, Strategic Intelligence, 38. 
140 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2002). 
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specific details as to the nature of such systems, and the participants.  The third area of 
the document dealing with local involvement is entitled “Domestic Counterterrorism.”  A 
portion of this section applies directly to the need for improved intergovernmental law 
enforcement coordination, specifically through the mechanism of the Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs).  The mechanism of information sharing has direct applicability to 
firefighters, as discussed in Chapter XVI. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 5 and 8 further contribute to 
our understanding of this subject matter.  HSPD-8 is concerned with policies for the 
preparation of local, state and federal resources in both preventing and responding to 
threatened or actual terrorist attacks and natural disasters.  It emphasizes an “all-hazards” 
approach but represents merely a roadmap to policy implementation.  Details are left to 
those who implement these policies, and therefore this document provides incentive but 
little structure.  HSPD-5 is concerned with the actual management of incidents and serves 
as a consequence management directive.  It requires the implementation of a National 
Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS).  This form 
of coordination is indirectly and marginally related to the prevention-driven intelligence 
function but, as indicated previously, the reduction of the magnitude of the impact of an 
event is a form of prevention in and of itself.   
The “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” 
concluded its definitive study of the 9-11 attacks with several findings.  Of importance is 
the conclusion that unity of effort in intelligence sharing is necessary for future challenges 
and that the resistance to the sharing of intelligence – both systemic and human - plays a 
key role in an inability to “connect the dots,” and must be overcome.  It explains that this 
objective must be based upon a realization that sharing outweighs the risk of inadvertent 
disclosure: “need-to-know” should be supplanted by “need-to-share.”141  The document 
also explores the need for the President to “safeguard the privacy of individuals about 
whom information is shared.”142  The Commission, therefore, identifies the need for 
sharing and lays the groundwork for doing so while protecting the civil rights of civilians, 
but does not identify how to accomplish these goals. 
                                                 
141 9/11 Commission Report, 417. 
142 Ibid., 394. 
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Further support for the argument that the intelligence community requires 
assistance is observed in positions taken by authors Isaacson and O’Connell.143  Citing 
the dangers posed by the “new threat” exemplified in Osama Bin Laden, particularly in 
light of the development of the intelligence community, the authors indicate that only 
some of the required analytical capabilities reside within the intelligence community 
today.  They observe that much of this capability resides elsewhere within the 
government.  They explain the reasons for secrecy within the intelligence community as 
being justifiable and necessary in the context of past threats, but indicate that this is an 
outdated and useless concept today.  Perhaps most germane to the subject at hand, they 
identify the most difficult aspect in attempts to facilitate intelligence sharing: not the re-
organization of the intelligence community, but the generation of better intelligence to 
share.  The fire community represents a new and untested mechanism for harvesting 
better intelligence. 
As observed above, the direction provided by literature that derives from within 
the intelligence community on the issue of local collaboration mechanisms is applicable 
but generally broad and conceptual in scope.  The literature that derives within the law 
enforcement community, however, tends to be more focused and specific, and therefore 
more actionable.   
In “Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture” the BJA 
examines how law enforcement agencies can improve their intelligence operations in a 
dual-mode fashion: to simultaneously support both homeland security and traditional 
crime prevention.144  Serving as a “how-to” guide for establishing and maintaining an 
intelligence capacity within a police agency, the emphasis is placed not on stand-alone 
intelligence capability, but rather on capability that is integral with the day-to-day 
functioning of a police agency.  A history of intelligence is provided, wherein it is 
established that field operations have generally collected information as opposed to 
intelligence.  Information is collectible.  Intelligence is defined as the sum of 
                                                 
143 Jeffery Isaacson and Kevin O’Connell, “Beyond Sharing Intelligence, We Must Generate 
Knowledge,” Rand Review, Summer 2002, available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/intelligence.html, last accessed May 25, 2006.  
144 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Intelligence 
Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 
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“information plus analysis,” and is not considered “collectible.”145  The intelligence 
function is described as serving a variety of needs, including decision making, planning, 
and strategic targeting.  The elements of the intelligence cycle are observed and described 
from a local perspective.  Within this description “collection” is proffered as the most 
labor intensive aspect of the intelligence process – again, with direct applicability to 
firefighters.  Civil rights abuses of the past are discussed, as well as the resultant need for 
information collection to be related to a standard of relevance – i.e., it must be relevant to 
criminal activity in order to be collectible.  It is recognized that this constraint does not 
encumber the firefighting community (see Chapter XII).  Importantly, the relationship 
between “intelligence-led policing” and fusion centers is explored, and the authors 
indicate that police work and counterterrorism operations are interrelated:  “good policing 
is good terrorism prevention.”146  A parallel statement may be made in the post-9/11 
world:  “good firefighting is good terrorism prevention.”  This thesis argues that this 
concept has not been realized.  A further concept, that of “problem-oriented policing” and 
its relationship to intelligence, is explored, with emphasis on the need for intelligence at 
the “beat level.”   The authors cite four levels of intelligence capability that apply to 
police agencies across the United States – levels of capability that are dependant upon the 
size and resources available to the agencies.  (Note that a similar “incremental” construct 
in counter-terrorism capability may be fashioned within the firefighting community, 
based upon its similarly variable nature.  Volunteer departments comprise 71.2% of the 
firefighting community, combined departments comprise 22%, and fully paid 
departments comprise 6.8%.147  Each level possesses different levels of resource 
availability).  Steps aimed at establishing an intelligence function within a police 
organization are then described and examples of successful intelligence operations are 
provided.  This work as a whole represents a useful local perspective with concepts that 
are derived locally, in the virtual absence of larger intelligence community concerns.  
While it can serve as a blueprint for the construction of an intelligence capability within 
                                                 
145 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Intelligence 
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an organization, and information is provided for the horizontal sharing of information 
among agencies, no methodology for tying into the intelligence community is provided.  
The work is therefore helpful as a guide to what may be needed internally in an agency, 
and may be paralleled by firefighting entities in their pursuit to accomplish a similar goal.  
It is not helpful when referring to the “big picture” of intelligence collaboration with the 
larger tiered intelligence community. 
In Mutual Aid:  Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats148 
BJA recognizes that a more collaborative approach between various players in 
counterterrorism is needed to meet future challenges.  Mutual aid is cited as a proven tool 
not only for response, but as a tool that may also be utilized for prevention.  The 
publication acknowledges the existence of mistrust between organizations as a significant 
impediment to mutual aid and a reason for establishing cooperative agreements.  The 
steps required in instituting an agreement are outlined in a step-by-step fashion.  
Although the information in this publication is not specific to intelligence sharing, it is a 
guideline that possesses features that are directly applicable to the creation of a 
collaborative intelligence system.  Similar lessons may be learned from “Engaging the 
Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security:  Law Enforcement – Private Security 
Partnerships.”149  This work provides a greater degree of information regarding the 
barriers to information sharing between law enforcement and a related community and 
the specific means to overcome these barriers.  It provides guidelines for collaboration 
and provides successful working examples of partnerships throughout the country. 
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has orchestrated the development of 
several other publications designed to enhance local intelligence operations by 
encouraging interaction between law enforcement and the community at all levels.  These 
publications have been developed by a consortium of police agencies that are sensitive to 
the needs of the local law enforcement community relative to terrorism prevention and 
response.  This community represents the most sensitive of the local participants to 
                                                 
148 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Mutual Aid:  
Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats, (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 
149 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Engaging the 
Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private Security Partnerships 
(Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 
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intelligence needs and provides information that is primarily lateral in nature; i.e., 
designed for horizontal collaboration.  The various publications are also current, 
published in 2004 and 2005, and serve to provide information that may serve as an 
example of how a fire intelligence system may best be established.  Pertinent to the issue 
at hand are sections that serve as “how-to” guides for establishing the basic structure of 
information systems that operate in conjunction with day-to-day operations; sections that 
offer “levels” of information sharing related to the needs of particular law enforcement 
agencies; lessons to be learned from mutual aid agreements with other agencies; and 
lessons learned from the engagement of the private sector.   
Perhaps the most specific, pertinent and applicable document regarding the 
construction of information and intelligence sharing mechanisms is that entitled Fusion 
Center Guidelines: Law Enforcement Intelligence Component.150  This document, 
published in July 2005, is the product of a collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and DHS, supported by various law enforcement experts and practitioners 
from local, state, tribal and federal agencies.  A focus group largely derived from a cross-
section of local, state and federal law-enforcement agencies was established to develop 
and recommend guidelines for the creation of fusion centers.  The document provides 
specific guidance to those responsible for law enforcement intelligence functions who 
intend to establish a collaborative working environment.  It recognizes the need for 
horizontal and vertical collaboration, defines the concept of “fusion” and the entity of the 
“fusion center,” and provides guidelines intended to serve as a blueprint for consistent 
and functional state-based fusion center structures.  It also introduces the concept of 
fusion as one directly supportive of prevention, response, and consequence management, 
and describes the efficiencies inherent in the fusion center concept.  The document is 
comprehensive and represents a valuable resource for those tasked with forming, or 
improving, law enforcement fusion centers within their state or locality.  The guidelines 
are similar to a “performance specification” intended to provide for a measure of 
consistency between the various fusion centers, while recognizing the need for flexibility 
in the individual fusion center structures with regard to the unique needs and 
                                                 
150 U. S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center 
Guidelines: Law Enforcement Intelligence Component (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 25, 2005). 
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characteristics of those involved.  A resource CD accompanies the document and is 
referenced throughout; it provides direct access to a large number of directly applicable 
standards, reports and website information, resulting in a voluminous amount of highly 
useful material.  The document itself falls short, however, of providing guidance that 
specifically permits incorporation of the fire community into the fusion process.  This 
appears to be the result of the heavily weighted law enforcement component of the 
developmental focus group, which naturally emphasizes law enforcement concerns and 
needs.  The document explains that further guidelines, presently under development, are 
specifically intended to provide similar guidance to public safety and private sector 
participants in fusion centers.  No time frame is provided for the publication of these 
guidelines.  As represented in Chapter III, they will likely have more direct applicability 
to firefighters. 
The fusion center concept is further explored in various academically derived 
thesis papers, including “State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative 
Approach in Modeling a State Fusion Center.”151  This work provides a closer look at the 
specific rationale for, and variable structures of, fusion centers in today’s environment.  It 
provides an evaluation of three fusion centers that have been chosen for analysis based 
upon their apparent functionality (these are located in Arizona, Georgia, and Los 
Angeles).  Specific questions are asked regarding each fusion center in order to provide a 
comparative analysis of how each operates and to provide a list of recommendations for 
the creation of an “optimal” center.  The result of this analysis is a practical set of 
guidelines for the establishment of a local fusion center, from the perspective of a 
participant/stakeholder within the center.  These guidelines include the incorporation of 
the fire community into the fusion center as most visibly illustrated in the description of 
the Los Angeles TEW (Terrorist Early Warning) Center. 
A further study of interoperability as observed in the Los Angeles Terrorism Early 
Warning (LA TEW) fusion center is provided in Terrorism Early Warning and Co-
                                                 
151 William Forsyth, “State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative Approach in 
Modeling a State Fusion Center” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 
2005). 
122 
Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence.152  In this work we find an introduction to 
the concept of “co-production of intelligence,” as implemented at the LA TEW, in the 
interest of a number of agencies across a wide geographic area.  A general description of 
the TEW organization is provided, as are a few concepts that may be implemented 
through a TEW in order to enhance productivity.  We also see the introduction of the 
important concept of the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), an entity that effectively 
represents the needs of the various participants in the fusion center and allows the center 
to become operational.  This unique collaborative mechanism provides a workable 
system for the incorporation of representatives of the fire community.   
The Markle Commission was established following 9-11-01 in order to determine 
measures to assist the nation in developing its information collection and analysis 
capabilities.  Among its findings were that the real frontlines of terrorism are collocated 
with the local official, outside of Washington, D.C., and that the number of emergency 
responders–cited at approximately 2 million–represents a primary and significant asset in 
Homeland Security.  It further concludes that this local resource has not been developed 
and that DHS should become the base for “building up a national community of 
intelligence contributors and analysts.”153  The information is logically presented and 
provides a perspective from outside the law enforcement and intelligence communities – 
the authors are largely drawn from the business and academic communities.  The 
information, however, is dated–the publication occurred in October 2002–and requires 
adjustment based upon changes in information systems that may have been implemented 
since publication. 
Certain literature is specific to the capabilities of the local law enforcement 
communities to contribute to domestic intelligence and security.  Lessons may be learned 
for the relatively uninformed, but similarly positioned, fire communities.  Among this 
literature is Defending the Homeland:  Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and 
Security by Nathan White.  White determines that intelligence is the key to winning the 
                                                 
152 John Sullivan, “Terrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence” 
(paper presented at 20th Anniversary International Conference, Canadian Association for Security and 
Intelligence Studies, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, October 21, 2005). 
153 Markle Foundation Task Force. Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age, available at 
http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle_report_Part1.pdf, last accessed May 20, 2006, 11. 
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shadow war of asymmetry, and that the police departments represent the ideal mechanism 
for gathering and exploiting intelligence.  He makes a strong argument that the more than 
600,000 law enforcement officers in the U.S. are uniquely positioned to serve as the 
“eyes and ears” of the intelligence agencies given their nexus to the community.  Real-
life examples in the successful observation, detection, and interdiction of potential 
terrorist events by street-level officers are provided.  He further reinforces the need for 
proactive, and not reactive, police agencies and recommends enhanced training in the 
recognition of terrorist indicators.  Lastly, White outlines the concerns of law 
enforcement collectors relative to civil liberties.  All of these have applicability to the fire 
service, by comparison and association.  
Literature that is more closely related to information within the fire service as 
opposed to intelligence is found within a thesis entitled “Terrorism Awareness and 
Education as a Prevention Strategy for First Responders” by Captain Alicia Welch of the 
Los Angeles Fire Department.154  Welch takes a broad organizational approach as she 
identifies cultural and institutional impediments to a more fully informed fire service.  An 
analysis of the functionality of the Los Angeles Fire Department, and specifically the LA 
Terrorism Early Warning Center (LA TEW), provide awareness of “best practices” as 
well as gaps in capabilities.  Welch uses community policing, Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT), Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), the State of 
Washington Homeland Security Plan and the New Jersey Office of Counterterrorism as 
models for change.  A past nationwide policy initiative known as “America Burning” is 
utilized as proof that broad-based changes in culture and policy are possible.  It is noted, 
however, that due to its stated intentions (the reduction of fire deaths, injuries and costs) 
the precepts of the “America Burning” model do not represent as large a cultural shift for 
the fire serviced as is likely to be required for terrorism.  Furthermore, Welch neglects to 
recognize that the successful implementation of the “America Burning” initiative was, to 
a large degree, accomplished not by responders but by administrators and non-response 
fire prevention personnel.  Lastly, within the thesis the interpretation of the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security and guidelines of the Office of Domestic Preparedness as 
                                                 
154 Alicia Welch, “Terrorism Awareness and Education as a Prevention Strategy for First Responders” 
(Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2006). 
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they pertain to the fire service is accomplished in an overly fire-centric and specific 
manner.  These documents are intended to provide general guidelines that are aimed at 
jurisdictions rather than fire departments.  Their accuracy and usefulness relative to the 
fire service are therefore questionable. 
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XVI. THE FINAL ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS DETERMINED TO BE 
VALUABLE IN THE PURSUIT OF SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN THE FDNY 
This thesis has provided a multitude of examples, observations, case studies, 
comparative analyses, and survey results that point to the need for a drastic improvement 
in the capability of the New York City Fire Department to manage information, and to 
keep its personnel informed regarding issues related to terrorism.  It seems clear that the 
gathering, use and sharing of information has been relatively incidental, fractured, and 
absent of a dedicated effort to address information as an independent and significant 
factor in terrorism preparedness.  It is also clear that information of importance resides 
both within and outside the FDNY.  Information of value must be identified so as to 
support both the long term “general” awareness of the department, and short term critical 
response demands.  The FDNY has not optimized its ability to exploit either type of 
information.  The criticality and vulnerability of the agency requires that a dedicated and 
organized effort be made toward the securing, processing and dissemination of terrorist 
related information to field units.  A degree of cooperation must also be developed across 
the different bureaus and departments within the FDNY to ensure the uniformity, quality 
and consistency of information. 
In this pursuit a well directed, focused, and adequately staffed terrorist unit must 
be established: a true “terrorism liaison” unit.  The composition of this proposed unit is 
illustrated in Figure 16.  As opposed to the well-intentioned, but relatively static and 
disassociated administratively dictated initiatives undertaken by the FDNY since 9-11, 
this unit should directly support those with the most to lose–field level responders–while 
simultaneously incorporating mechanisms to collect, process, store and disseminate 
critical information (including intelligence).  It should be staffed with individuals who 
have been carefully selected based upon actual skill sets and experience, rather than rank 
or undefined criteria.  It should also possess the ability to identify target hazard locations 
and to work with other agencies to develop “case files,” including vulnerability 
assessments, for those locations deemed most likely to be the scene of a catastrophic 
terrorist event (i.e., the World Trade Center).  Lastly, it must manage to form a 
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mechanism of terrorism information diffusion within the department that is consistent 
and uniform, recognizable to operations level personnel, and contributory to the support 
of functions such as training and the development of policies and procedures.  This 
diffusion is graphically depicted as a yellow swathe in Figure 16. 
 
A. KEY OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTS 
 
Eight key objectives of a Terrorism Liaison Unit intended to truly serve the best 
interests of the fire department and operations-level personnel may be extracted from the 
specific needs identified within this thesis:   
• The identification, targeting and procurement of critical information that 
resides within the reach of the department.  For example: the FDNY 
Bureau of Fire Prevention may provide existing information on specific 
building weaknesses relative to fire protection.  The FDNY Bureau of 
Personnel may provide existing information on the capabilities of new 
hires.  The NY City Building Department can provide information on 
structural weaknesses at target hazard locations.  But such provision will 
not happen on its own; the information must be actively sought.  Several 
personnel within the Terrorism Liaison Unit should be tasked solely with 
proactively exploiting all available existing resources. 
• The communication of information needs to and from law enforcement 
entities and the establishment of a system that permits the reliable and 
efficient exchange of such information.  This will not require full-time 
dedicated personnel but rather a structure of information exchange 
utilizing those who comprise the terrorism unit and their contacts in law 
enforcement.  Operations personnel should be placed within the JTTF to 
enhance this capability.  This structure should be known, and thereby 
accessible, to personnel “in the field.” 
• The continued and enhanced encouragement of field units to actively 
observe, identify and report terrorist indicators to a central location within 
the department, and the establishment of a network within the ranks of the 
department for transmission of such information.  This will also not 
require a tremendous amount of dedicated manpower but rather a focused 
effort to construct an information transmission system and advertise it to 
the “troops.”  The network will be passive until activated.  Personnel 
within the Terrorism Liaison Unit may construct this network in addition 
to other duties. 
• The consolidation, exploitation, processing and “narrowing” of the 
intelligence and information obtained in the above referenced manners for 
the use of the FDNY and others; also, the ability to cultivate other sources 
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of available information.  In short, this constitutes the capability to 
develop fire intelligence.  This process is depicted in Figure 16.  This 
specialized pursuit will require full time high quality and trained 
personnel.  Products of this effort will be made functional to operations 
and supervisory personnel by inclusion in easily digested published orders 
and directives.  The analysis component of the Terrorism Liaison Unit will 
support both the operational and psychological needs of the fire 
department and must keep the response units informed as to the extent and 
nature of its activities. 
• The capability to deliver fire intelligence to the command staff at 
headquarters, to the commanders at an incident scene, and to the law 
enforcement community on short notice and as needed.  Currently the fire 
department is investing heavily in technological solutions for such issues 
as evidenced by the FDNY 2007-2008 Strategic Plan.155  Two factors 
must be considered in the effort to further improve information sharing: 
that technology is a mere tool to assist in the development and 
implementation of “people-based” solutions, and that the critical 
component in the development of solutions is the structures that permit 
people to communicate efficiently and reliably.  This objective will likely 
necessitate the revamping of the existing outdated CIDS system so as to 
incorporate greater capacity for “known” (pre-derived) information in a 
more structured format, specific to terrorist threats.  Such a system must 
also support the rapid input of developing intelligence for the use of 
commanders on-scene.   
• The capability to rapidly procure and disseminate critical information 
concerning terrorist attacks that occur in other locations to operations-
level personnel so as to immediately enhance the awareness and safety of 
firefighting units.  The department has decidedly failed in this seemingly 
simple endeavor.  This is a critical objective to accomplish that can utilize 
either existing technologies or rapidly developing systems of information 
transfer.  Written publications distributed 6 days after a significant attack 
on foreign soil is insufficient considering the global potentiality of the 
“new terrorism.” 
• Focused effort to eliminate the disjointedness that characterizes the FDNY 
regarding the development of policies and procedures.  The right hand 
must know what the left is doing.  The Terrorism Liaison Unit can serve 
as the mechanism by which terrorism related information is maintained 
consistent and uniform across the department. All such information would 
necessarily pass through this unit.  The historical absence of participation 
of important elements within the department in the development of such 
publications as the Strategic Plans and haz-mat/wmd guidelines must be 
eliminated through a “hub” that connects the divergent spokes.  This  
 
                                                 
155 FDNY, FDNY 2007-2008 Strategic Plan, 7, 14-15, 28-29. 
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provision will serve a secondary purpose of providing reasonable test 
(study) material for future officers and thereby increase the quality of 
FDNY leadership. 
• The establishment of a systemic mechanism to identify and utilize 
personnel within the department who possess extraordinary capabilities 
and qualifications.  A licensed structural engineer should not spend 20 
years in a Fire Department without being provided the opportunity to 
share his or her ancillary experience and knowledge in the pursuit of 
safety and efficiency.  This holds particular value in a city that possesses 
the most numerous and diverse structures in the world, and which has 
suffered tremendous losses from structural failure due to terrorist acts as 
well as during routine firefighting response.  True awareness of 
professional standards that exist outside the narrow confines of the FDNY 
must be realized, and established standards must be understood and 
complied with.  Furthermore, personnel who are not truly qualified should 
not be permitted to occupy positions that demand a minimum standard or 
qualification.  The absence of such a program runs counter to the pursuit 
of true professionalism and introduces a wide variety of potential 
problems, including legal challenges in the event of preventable 
catastrophe.  The world will never know the true consequences of an 
absence of optimized resource allocation and training, particularly that 
which characterized the FDNY prior to 9-11. 
• The critical need to raise the awareness of individuals at the operational 
level regarding terrorist threats, indicators, and the necessity for constant 
readiness.  Assuming that firefighters will maintain an offensive posture 
during periods of non-emergency activity is unreasonable.  The mobility 
and access afforded to firefighters on a daily basis will be valuable only if 
they are incorporated into the “program” of counter-terrorism.  A 
workforce that feels it is being ignored is less likely to be self-motivated.  
A workforce that is untrained will not be effective.  Therefore both 
motivation and training must be included in terrorism-based initiatives.  A 
standing army of over 11,000 highly motivated personnel should not 
remain permanently encamped between battles without sharpening its 
swords and oiling its cannons.  Constant reminders to do so will inevitably 
produce heightened effectiveness.  These provisions will assist in the 
development of a system of active “collectors,” in support of the activity 
that represents the first step in the development of fire intelligence (see 
Figure 16). 
• The ability to “operationalize” fire intelligence.  A response component 
within the Terrorism Liaison Unit is considered critical for effective and 
timely information transfer.  The ACTIC model may be utilized as a 
model for this mechanism, whereby trained and well equipped personnel 
with “reach-back” capability can respond to the scene of an incident to 
support informational needs.  Personnel will be carefully selected based 
upon qualifications. Efforts by such personnel should include active 
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participation in the development of vulnerability assessments and the 
capability to respond in a timely fashion.  Terrorism Liaison Unit 
personnel must be capable of access to decision makers within the FDNY 
on an “as needed” basis as well as scheduled periodic access through 
meetings.  They should also be drawn from the responder community and 
have a distinct structure for the dissemination of information to field units 
during periods of “non-emergency” (see below). 
• The ability to “diffuse” fire intelligence.  The Terrorism Liaison Unit must 
possess the ability to diffuse and disseminate important information to the 
various consumers of information on a day-to-day basis, to bolster their 
awareness and knowledge.  This can be accomplished by Terrorism 
Liaison Officers (see Figure 16), either through person-to-person contact 
at fire stations or through the production of informational bulletins.  The 
domain of these individuals is depicted in yellow in Figure 16. 
An illustration of the recommended system of information management and its 
relationship to existing information systems is illustrated in Figure 16. 
 
B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
A plethora of evidence and unfortunate experience indicates that the FDNY has 
not identified information management as an independent and critical need.  Concepts of 
deficiency and key objectives have been identified and elucidated within this thesis.  
Adequate sources of funding must be obtained, capacity must be increased, and creative 
solutions must be developed to satisfy these informational needs.  The next attack is 
coming.  Distraction with the significant day-to-day demands of the department must not 
detract from the need to better prepare for this event in a holistic and rational manner. 
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APPENDIX.  INFORMATION SURVEY OF FDNY MEMBERS 
Zoomerang Survey Results
Terrorism Information within the FDNY
Response Status: Completes
Filter: No filter applied
Mar 22, 2007 12:44 PM PST
Firefighter 348 65%
1st Line Spvsr( Lt./Capt.) 153 28%
Battalion Chief/Deputy Chief (Field 
Operations) 27 5%
Battalion Chief/Deputy Chief 
(Management) 7 1%
Staff Chief (Headquarters or 
Equivalent) 3 1%
538 100%
Less than 2 117 22%
2 through 5 171 32%
5 through 10 135 25%
10 through 15 56 10%
> 15 60 11%
539 100%
< 2 45 8%
2 thru 5 97 18%
5 thru 10 131 24%
10 thru 15 95 18%
> 15 170 32%
538 100%
High School 27 5%
Some College or trade school 276 51%
4 Year College Degree 209 39%
Masters Degree 18 3%
Advanced Degree above Masters 6 1%
536 100%
3. [Time on Job] How many years have you been employed by the Fire Department?
Total
4. [Level of Education] What is your highest level of education?
Total
1. [Rank] First I need to know a little bit about you. What is your current job title, job capacity or function within 
the Department?
Total






1 to 10 175 33%
11 to 30 13 2%
31 to 60 19 4%
Greater than 60 8 1%
537 100%
Operations Level 239 44%
CPC 77 14%
Technician 1 84 16%
Technician 2 91 17%
Specialist 32 6%
Don't Know 16 3%
539 100%
0 85 16%
1 to 10 302 56%
11 to 30 68 13%
31 to 50 22 4%
over 50 61 11%
538 100%
Top number is the count of 
respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total 
respondents selecting the option.





















The likelihood of harmful agent 
release at a response site
Immediate threats received 
regarding the response cite
History of the occupancy regarding 
past threats
History/beliefs of an individual or 
group that may intentionally cause 
Danger of harm posed by 
intentionally harmful agents
Age of structure
Occupancy (i.e., what does the 
building house?)
Security measures that may be 
present
Number and location of potential 
victims
7. [Haz Mat Responses] How many responses do you as an individual have per year that primarily involve 
hazardous materials releases? (i.e., accidentally released chemicals, biologicals, radiological, etc..., as well as 
terrorist agents).
Total
8. [Information] Here's a list of various types of information related to response. On a scale of 1 to 3, please 
indicate the importance of each category of information to you as a responder on a typical day responding from 
the firehouse. 
Building construction characteristics 
(material,layout, etc...)
5. [Number Supervised] How many individuals do you supervise on a typical shift of duty?
Total
6. [Special Training] Please indicate the level of Haz Mat/WMD training you have received (note: "Operations 





Top number is the count of 
respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total 
respondents selecting the option.





















Top number is the count of 
respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total 
respondents selecting the option.











Top number is the count of 
respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total 
respondents selecting the option.

















11. [Adequacy of Fire Information] Of the information that you receive from your agency regarding FIRE 
RELATED subject matter, please indicate on a scale of 1 to 3 the quality of that information.
Accuracy
10. [Adequacy of Terror Information] Of the information that you receive from your agency regarding 





History of the occupancy regarding 
past threats
History/beliefs of an individual or 
group that may intentionally cause 
Danger of harm posed by 
intentionally harmful agents
The likelihood of harmful agent 
release at a response site
Occupancy (i.e., what does the 
building house?)
Security measures that may be 
present
Number and location of potential 
victims
Immediate threats received 
regarding the response cite
9. [Information Support] Here is the same list as provided above. On a scale of 1 to 3 please rate how well the 
Department has kept you informed regarding each category.







Not Sure 335 62%
537 100%
I do not know enough to answer this 
question without guessing (therefore 





















I don't know what CIDS is 0 0%
535 100%Total
Total
15. [Knowledge of Info Group] Is there an individual or group within your agency specifically responsible for 
obtaining terrorist related information helpful to response and distributing it to the workforce?
Total
16. [CIDS] Have you ever contributed in any fashion to the collection or submission of CIDS (Computer 
Information Dispatch System) information?
12. [Information Provided] Does your agency receive information on a regular basis in a formal fashion from 
other agencies concerned with terrorism, such as the Police Dept and the FBI? (Formal basis refers to an 
organized structure for the transfer of information).
Total
13. [Define Intelligence] Without referring to resource material please select from the following list. Check off 
the 5 terms that are commonly cited as part of the process known as the "intelligence cycle".
14. [Agency influence] Have you been encouraged by your agency to observe, identify or report indications of 






Not Sure 88 16%







Don't know 42 8%
Not Applicable (no special skills) 330 61%
537 100%
Top number is the count of 
respondents selecting the option. 
Bottom % is percent of the total 
respondents selecting the option.
1 2 3 4 5 6
127 45 32 55 48 80
33% 12% 8% 14% 12% 21%
37 61 61 72 78 71
10% 16% 16% 19% 21% 19%
33 74 103 86 55 32
9% 19% 27% 22% 14% 8%
31 72 98 96 89 63
7% 16% 22% 21% 20% 14%
92 113 91 63 59 42
20% 25% 20% 14% 13% 9%
104 117 97 64 64 69
20% 23% 19% 12% 12% 13%
DART (Disaster Assistance 
Response Team) 290 57%
USAR (Urban Search and Rescue 
Team) 310 60%
IMT (Incident Management Team) 172 34%
NIMS (National Incident 
Management System) 164 32%
CERT (Civilian Emergency 









Fire Department classroom sessions 
(Fire Academy, Ft. Totten)
Drills held in Firehouse Quarters
21. [Current Federal Resource Awareness] Which of the following are examples of dedicated local emergency 
response assets that are federally funded and which respond nationally? 
22. [Fire versus Terror prep] If the sum total of information that you receive from the Fire Dept. for responding to 
and fighting FIRES is rated as an arbitrary "4" in terms of value, what number would you assign to the total 
information you are provided by the Department relative to responding to TERRORISM (on a value scale of 1 
through 7). Note: 1 is low value. 7 is high value).
Televised News (CNN, FOX, NBC, 
etc...)
Televised Documentaries




19. [Job Knowledge of Resources] Is your agency aware of your special skills or capabilities?
Total
20. [Value of Sources of Info] Please RANK the following sources of information relative to the value that each has had on your 
level of awareness for responding safely and efficiently to potential terrorist events. Each source of information should be given 
one number. The source with the most value should be given number 1, the least valuable source should be given number 6.
17. [CIDS Adequacy] Do you consider the CIDS program adequate for supporting terrorist-related responses?
Total
18. [Database of Resources] Do you possess special certifiable skills or capabilities that may be useful in 
advanced rescue/firefighting activity (i.e., crane operators license, professional engineers license, dive master, 



























[Comments] For anybody who wishes to provide additional information regarding firefighter information, 
awareness and safety: please type in the space below any specific experiences you have had regarding 
successes or failures with information flow, observations of terrorist activity, or any suggestions that you may 
have to improve our awareness level for terrorism and firefighting. Thanks very much to all of you for your help 
with this survey, and stay safe!
The remaining questions are only for those who answered "yes" to the previous question. All others are asked 
to go to the very end of the questionnaire to the "comments" section. Thanks!
27. [WTC Floors] Prior to 9-11 were you familiar with the type of construction that comprised the floors within 
the Twin Towers? 
Total
28. [1st Battalion] Prior to 9-11 were you ever assigned to the First Battalion?
Total
25. [9-11 Enhancement of Target Hazard Info] Since 9-11 has your awareness of the construction characteristics 
of any target hazard locations in NY City improved relative to your awareness before 9-11? (A target hazard is a 
location that may attract terrorist attack due to its specific occupancy, stature, symbolic or economic 
significance, etc...).
Total
26. [WTC Egress] Prior to 9-11 were you familiar with the characteristics of the means of egress that existed in 
the Twin Towers (number, size, location)?
Total
23. [On Job for 9-11] Were you employed by the New York City Fire Department prior to, and during, 9-11?
Total
24. [Influence of 9-11] Has your ability to receive terrorism related information from your agency that increases 
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